[guru] Cisco biztonsagi frissitesek
DATE: Tue, 09 Mar 2010 00:55:31 +0100
A Cisco IOS XR SSH daemon-ja összeomlasztható, és minden összeomláskor
memleak is fellép. Emiatt a támadás többszöri végrehajtása az egész
eszközt DoS-olhatja.
A CiscoWorks Internetwork Performance Monitor (IPM) for Microsoft Windows
2.6 és korábbi verziói buffer overflow hibát tartalmaznak a CORBA GIOP
kérések feldolgozása közben. A távoli azonosítatlan támadó SYSTEM jogokkal
kódot futtathat a rendszeren.
SQL injection, jogosulatlan account létrehozási (akár admin jogú is!),
létező felhasználók és jelszavaik listázása miatt súlyos információ
szivárgási, valamint a bejelentkezési protokoll gyengesége miatt admin
jogot adó hibákat találtak a Cisco Unified MeetingPlace szoftverében.
XSS hibát találtak a Cisco Secure Desktop POST kérés feldolgozójában.
A Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance beépített HTTPS szervere valamint a
WebSafe servlet is információ szivárgási hibát tartalmaz, ezekkel a támadó
fájlokhoz férhet hozzá. A HTTPS szerver egy másik hibája pedig kód futtatást
tesz lehetővé a azonosítás nélküli távoli támadók számára.
A Management Center for Cisco Security Agents directory traversal illetve
SQL injection hibákat tartalmaz, ezen kívül a Cisco Security Agent DoS-olható
is.
A Cisco ASA 5500 sorozatú Adaptive Security Appliance-k több DoS hibát
is tartalmaznak (túl sok kapcsolat, SIP és SCCP inspection modul, WebVPN
datagram TLS, TCP szegmentációs hiba, IKE hibás üzenet feldolgozás),
valamint az NT LAN Manager v1 (NTLMv1) azonosítás kikerülhető.
A Cisco Catalyst 6500 sorozatú switch-ek és 7600 sorozatú router-ek
Firewall Services Module (FWSM) alrendszere DoS-olható egy megfelelően
preparált SCCP protokollú csomaggal, amennyiben az SCCP ellenőrzés
bekapcsolt.
A Cisco Unified Communications Manager (régebben Cisco CallManager) SIP,
SCCP és CTI szolgáltatásai DoS-olhatóak.
A Cisco Digital Media Manager default jelszavakat tartalmaz, az egyszerű
jogokkal rendszelkező felhasználó megváltoztathatja a konfigurációt, hogy
admin jogokat szerezzen, valamint a bejelentkezett felhasználók olyan
információhoz férhetnek hozzá, amivel később plusz jogokat szerezhetnek.
A Cisco Digital Media Player lehetővé teszi, hogy egy azonosítás nélküli
támadó video és adattartalmat jeleníthessen meg a távoli munkaállomáson.
--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS XR Software SSH Denial of Service
Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100120-xr-ssh
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 January 20 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
The SSH server implementation in Cisco IOS XR Software contains a
vulnerability that an unauthenticated, remote user could exploit to
cause a denial of service condition.
An attacker could trigger this vulnerability by sending a crafted SSH
version 2 packet that may cause a new SSH connection handler process to
crash. Repeated exploitation may cause each new SSH connection handler
process to crash and lead to a significant amount of memory being
consumed, which could introduce instability that may adversely impact
other system functionality. During this event, the parent SSH daemon
process will continue to function normally.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100120-xr-ssh.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
This vulnerability affects Cisco IOS XR systems that are running an
affected version of Cisco IOS XR Software and have the SSH server
feature enabled. A system with the SSH server feature enabled will
have the command ssh server [v2] present in its configuration. Refer
to the "Cisco IOS XR System Security Configuration Guide" at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r3.9/security/configuration/guide/sc39ssh.html#wp1044523
for additional details regarding configuration of the SSH server in Cisco
IOS XR Software.
The SSH server can only be enabled in Cisco IOS XR Software if
the "security" Package Information Envelope (PIE) is installed.
Administrators can issue the show install summary command to confirm
if the security PIE is installed. This command will display an active
package similar to "<platform>-k9sec-<version>" or, for example,
"c12k-k9sec-3.6.1" if the security PIE is installed.
Refer to the "Software Version and Fixes" section of this advisory for
information on specific affected software versions.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
SSH server implementations in Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE
Software are not affected by this vulnerability.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
Cisco IOS XR Software is a member of the Cisco IOS Software family that
uses a microkernel-based distributed operating system infrastructure.
Cisco IOS XR Software runs on the Cisco CRS-1 Carrier Routing System,
Cisco 12000 Series Routers, and Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregation
Services Routers. More information on Cisco IOS XR Software is available
at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps5845/index.html.
The SSH protocol was developed as a secure replacement for the Telnet,
FTP, rlogin, remote shell (rsh), and Remote Copy Protocol (RCP)
protocols, which allow for remote device access. SSH varies from
these older protocols in that it provides strong authentication and
confidentiality and uses encrypted transactions.
The SSH server implementation in Cisco IOS XR Software contains a
vulnerability that an unauthenticated, remote user could exploit to
cause a denial of service condition.
The vulnerability is triggered when a new SSH handler process handles
a crafted SSH version 2 packet, which may cause the process to crash.
During this event, a significant amount of memory may be consumed.
Repeated exploitation may impact other system functionality, depending
upon the size of the available memory and the duration of attack.
Although exploitation of this vulnerability does not require user
authentication, the TCP three-way handshake must be completed, and some
SSH protocol negotiation must occur.
The SSH service will continue to function normally during an after an
attack.
During exploitation of this vulnerability, the system may generate the
following messages:
RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.885 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-7-DUMP_ATTRIBUTE : Dump request with attribute 407 for process pkg/bin/sshd_child_handler
RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.897 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-7-SIGSEGV : Thread 1 received SIGSEGV
RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.901 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-7-BUS_ADRERR : Accessed BadAddr 50199000 at PC 4a280c64
RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.906 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-4-CRASH_INFO : Crashed pid = 21733716 (pkg/bin/sshd_child_handler)
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsu10574 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0137.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* CSCsu10574 ("sshd_child_handler crashes with crafted SSHv2 packet")
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory
could result in a crash of the SSH connection handler process. Repeated
exploitation may impact other system functionality, depending upon the
size of the available memory and the duration of attack.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
This vulnerability can be addressed by applying the appropriate
Software Maintenance Upgrade (SMU), per the table below.
Installation of the appropriate SMU does not require a system
reload. Refer to the document "Guidelines for Cisco IOS XR Software"
(http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/iosswrel/ps8803/ps5845/product_bulletin_c25-478699.html)
for additional information on Cisco IOS XR Software and SMUs.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Cisco | SMU Name and SMU ID |
|IOS XR |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Release | CRS-1 | XR12000 | ASR 9000 |
| | | | (*) |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.4.1.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.4.1.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.4.1 | | | applicable |
| | AA03509 | AA03532 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.4.2.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.4.2.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.4.2 | | | applicable |
| | AA03510 | AA03531 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.4.3.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.4.3.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.4.3 | | | applicable |
| | AA03511 | AA03530 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.5.2.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.5.2.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.5.2 | | | applicable |
| | AA03512 | AA03529 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.5.3.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.5.3.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.5.3 | | | applicable |
| | AA03513 | AA03528 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.5.4.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.5.4.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.5.4 | | | applicable |
| | AA03514 | AA03527 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.6.0.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.6.0.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.6.0 | | | applicable |
| | AA03515 | AA03526 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.6.1.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.6.1.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.6.1 | | | applicable |
| | AA03516 | AA03525 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| 3.6.2 | Not affected | Not affected | Not |
| | | | applicable |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| 3.6.3 | Not affected | Not affected | Not |
| | | | applicable |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| | hfr-k9sec-3.7.0.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.7.0.CSCsu10574 | Not |
| 3.7.0 | | | applicable |
| | AA03519 | AA03522 | |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| 3.7.1 | Not affected | Not affected | Not |
| | | | affected |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| 3.7.2 | Not affected | Not affected | Not |
| | | | affected |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| 3.8.x | Not affected | Not affected | Not |
| | | | applicable |
|---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------|
| 3.9.x | Not affected | Not affected | Not |
| | | | affected |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
(*) Not all Cisco IOS XR Software versions are supported by the Cisco
ASR 9000 Aggregation Services Routers.
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Network administrators
are advised to apply mitigation techniques to help limit exposure to the
vulnerability. Mitigation techniques consist of allowing only legitimate
devices to connect to the routers.
These access restrictions can be accomplished by using interface
access control lists (ACLs) or the Management Plane Protection (MPP)
feature that is available in Cisco IOS XR Software Release 3.5 and
later. For information on MPP, refer to the configuration guide
at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios_xr_sw/iosxr_r3.8/security/configuration/guide/sc38mpp.html
and the MPP command reference at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios_xr_sw/iosxr_r3.8/security/command/reference/sr38mpp.html.
Infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) are also a useful technique to mitigate
potential exploitation of this vulnerability.
For more information on these mitigations, consult the Cisco
Guide to Harden Cisco IOS XR Devices, which is available at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/CiscoIOSXR.html.
Note that access classes in line templates applied to VTY pools are not
an effective mitigation for this vulnerability.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers,
and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered by Cisco during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100120-xr-ssh.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2010-January-20 | Initial public release |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Jan 20, 2010 Document ID: 111459
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--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: CiscoWorks Internetwork Performance Monitor
CORBA GIOP Overflow Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100120-ipm
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 January 20 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
CiscoWorks Internetwork Performance Monitor (IPM) versions 2.6 and
earlier for Microsoft Windows operating systems contain a buffer
overflow vulnerability that could allow a remote unauthenticated
attacker to execute arbitrary code. There are no workarounds for this
vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100120-ipm.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
CiscoWorks IPM versions 2.6 and earlier for Windows operating systems
are affected.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
CiscoWorks IPM version 2.x for Sun Solaris and CiscoWorks IPM version
4.x for Windows and Solaris operating systems are not affected. No
other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
CiscoWorks IPM is a troubleshooting application that gauges network
response time and availability. CiscoWorks IPM is available as a
component within the CiscoWorks LAN Management Solution (LMS) bundle.
CiscoWorks IPM versions 2.6 and earlier for Windows contain a buffer
overflow vulnerability when processing Common Object Request Broker
Architecture (CORBA) GIOP requests. By sending a crafted CORBA GIOP
request, a remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to trigger
the buffer overflow condition and execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM
privileges on affected Windows systems. This vulnerability is
documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsv62350 and has been assigned the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2010-0138.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCsv62350 - Malformed CORBA GIOP request causes crash
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 9.5
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Unavailable
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in the
ability to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on affected
Windows systems.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
Ciscoworks IPM versions 2.6 and earlier for Windows contain a
vulnerable third-party component that is no longer supported. Cisco
is unable to provide updated software for affected CiscoWorks
versions. Consult the "Obtaining Fixed Software" section of this
advisory for instructions on how to address vulnerable systems.
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. It is possible to
mitigate this vulnerability by restricting network access to TCP
ports on an affected Windows system running IPM versions 2.6 and
earlier to trusted systems.
Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco
devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied
Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100120-ipm.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Ciscoworks IPM versions 2.6 and earlier for Windows contain a
vulnerable third-party component that is no longer supported. Cisco
is unable to provide updated software for affected CiscoWorks
versions.
Customers with active software licenses for the IPM component of
CiscoWorks versions 2.6 and earlier for Windows should send email to
the following address for instructions on migrating to non-vulnerable
software:
ipm-corba-fix@cisco.com
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered and reported to Cisco by
TippingPoint. Cisco would like to thank TippingPoint for reporting
this vulnerability to us and for working with us on a coordinated
disclosure.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100120-ipm.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2010-January-20 | public |
| | | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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--- Begin Message ---
ZDI-10-004: Cisco CiscoWorks IPM GIOP getProcessName Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-10-004
January 21, 2010
-- CVE ID:
CVE-2010-0138
-- Affected Vendors:
Cisco
-- Affected Products:
Cisco Internetwork Performance Monitor
-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 6790.
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:
http://www.tippingpoint.com
-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of Cisco CiscoWorks Internetwork Performance
Monitor. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists in the handling of CORBA GIOP requests. By
making a specially crafted getProcessName GIOP request an attacker can
corrupt memory. Successful exploitation can result in a full compromise
with SYSTEM credentials.
-- Vendor Response:
Cisco has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More
details can be found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a0080b1351d.shtml
-- Disclosure Timeline:
2008-10-15 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2010-01-21 - Coordinated public release of advisory
-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* Anonymous
-- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.
Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.
Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/
--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified
MeetingPlace
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100127-mp
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 Jan 27 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Multiple vulnerabilities exist in Cisco Unified MeetingPlace. This
security advisory outlines the details of these vulnerabilities:
* Insufficient validation of SQL commands
* Unauthorized account creation
* User and password enumeration in Cisco MeetingTime
* Privilege escalation in Cisco MeetingTime
Workarounds are not available for these vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100127-mp.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Cisco Unified MeetingPlace versions 5, 6, and 7 are each affected by
at least one of the vulnerabilities described in this document.
The Cisco Unified MeetingPlace conferencing solution provides
functionality that allows organizations to host integrated voice,
video, and web conferencing. The solution is deployed on-network and
integrated directly into an organization's private voice/data
networks and enterprise applications. Cisco Unified MeetingPlace
servers can be deployed so that the server is accessible from the
Internet, allowing external parties to participate in meetings.
Cisco MeetingTime is a desktop application included with Cisco
Unified MeetingPlace version 6.x that could be used to access and
configure the Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Audio Server systems.
MeetingTime classifies users as either end users, contacts,
attendants, or system administrators.
The end-of-software maintenance for MeetingPlace version 5.3 occurred
in April 2009. End-of-sale and end-of-life details are available at:
http://cco-rtp-1.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/voicesw/ps6789/ps5664/ps5669/prod_end-of-life_notice0900aecd806e743c.html
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities in
the MeetingPlace and MeetingTime products. These vulnerabilities are
independent of each other.
Insufficient Validation of SQL Commands
An unauthenticated user may be able to send SQL commands to
manipulate the database that MeetingPlace uses to store information
about server configuration, meetings, and users. These commands could
be used to create, delete, or alter any of the information contained
in the Cisco Unified MeetingPlace database.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc39691
and has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2010-0139.
Unauthorized Account Creation
An unauthenticated user may be able to send a crafted URL to the
internal interface of the Cisco Unified MeetingPlace web server to
create a MeetingPlace user or administrator account.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc59231
and CSCtd40661 and has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2010-0140.
User and Password Enumeration in Cisco MeetingTime
The MeetingTime authentication sequence consists of a series of
packets that are transmitted between the client and the Cisco Meeting
Place Audio Server over TCP port 5001. An attacker may be able to
alter the authentication sequence to access sensitive information in
the user database including usernames and passwords.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsv76935
and has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2010-0141.
Privilege Escalation in Cisco MeetingTime
An attacker may be able to alter the packets in the MeetingTime
authentication sequence to elevate the privileges of a normal user to
an administrative user.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsv66530
and has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2010-0142.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCtc39691 - Insufficient validation of SQL commands
CVSS Base Score - 9
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Partial
Integrity Impact - Partial
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.8
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCtc59231/CSCtd40661 - Unauthorized account creation
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsv76935 - User and password enumeration in Cisco MeetingTime
CVSS Base Score - 6.4
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Partial
Integrity Impact - Partial
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 5.3
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsv66530 - Privilege escalation in Cisco MeetingTime
CVSS Base Score - 8.5
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Medium
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in a
variety of conditions including: information disclosure, denial of
service, privilege escalation, account creation, or alteration of
configuration data.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
The following table identifies the version of software in which each
vulnerability was first fixed.
The latest versions of Cisco MeetingPlace software can be downloaded
from:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278785523
+---------------------------------------------+
| Vulnerability | MeetingPlace | MeetingPlace |
| | 6 | 7 |
|---------------+--------------+--------------|
| Insufficient | | 7.0(2.3) |
| validation of | 6.0.639.2 | hotfix 5F |
| SQL commands | | |
|---------------+--------------+--------------|
| Unauthorized | | 7.0(2.3) |
| account | 6.0.639.3 | hotfix 5F |
| creation | | |
|---------------+--------------+--------------|
| User and | | |
| password | | Not |
| enumeration | MR5 | applicable |
| in Cisco | | |
| MeetingTime | | |
|---------------+--------------+--------------|
| Privilege | | Not |
| escalation in | MR5 | applicable |
| MeetingTime | | |
+---------------------------------------------+
When considering software upgrades, also consult:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a
complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for the vulnerabilities described in this
advisory.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for
software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.
Refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
Cisco would like to thank the National Australia Bank's Security
Assurance team and Credit Suisse for the discovery and reporting of
these vulnerabilities.
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the
vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100127-mp.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2010-Jan-27 | public |
| | | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory
http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/
Cisco Secure Desktop XSS/JavaScript Injection
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: Cisco Secure Desktop XSS/JavaScript Injection
Advisory Id: CORE-2010-0106
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/cisco-secure-desktop-xss
Date published: 2010-02-01
Date of last update: 2010-02-01
Vendors contacted: Cisco
Release mode: Coordinated release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Cross site scripting [CWE-79]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
Bugtraq ID: 37960
CVE Name: CVE-2010-0440
3. *Vulnerability Description*
The Cisco Secure Desktop web application does not sufficiently verify if
a well-formed request was provided by the user who submitted the POST
request, resulting in a cross-site scripting vulnerability.
In order to be able to sucessfully make the attack, the Secure Desktop
application on the Cisco Appliance must be turned on.
4. *Vulnerable packages*
. Cisco Secure Desktop 3.4.2048
. Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.
5. *Non-vulnerable packages*
. Cisco Secure Desktop 3.5.841
6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*
Cisco Security Alert:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=19843
7. *Credits*
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Matias Pablo Brutti
from Core Security Technologies.
The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Jorge Lucangeli Obes
from Core Security Technologies Advisories Team.
8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities allow an attacker to execute
arbitrary scripting code in the context of the user browser (in the
vulnerable application's domain). For example, an attacker could exploit
an XSS vulnerability to steal user cookies (and then impersonate the
legitimate user) or fake a page requesting information to the user
(i.e.: credentials). This vulnerability occurs when user-supplied data
is displayed without encoding.
The Cisco Secure Desktop web application does not sufficiently verify if
a well-formed request was provided by the user who submitted the POST
request. The cross-site scripting vulnerability was found in the
following file/url:
/-----
https://{IP}//+CSCOT+/translation?textdomain=csd&prefix=trans&lang=en-us
- -----/
Using the POST variable:
/-----
Starting, please wait..."><script>alert(1);</script>
- -----/
The content of the POST field is not being encoded at the time of using
them in HTML output, therefore allowing an attacker who controls their
content to insert JavaScript code. Furthermore, we could possibly inject
JavaScript code into the 'start.html' page because the content of the
previously mentioned POST is used in 'binary/mainv.js' as input for an
'eval()' function, hence allowing an attacker to inject any code without
restrictions which will be executed in the context of the 'eval()'
function:
/-----
282 http_request.open('POST', path, false);
283 http_request.send(msgs);
284 var trans = new Array();
285 try {
286 eval(http_request.responseText);
287 } catch (e) {}
- -----/
8.1. *Proof of Concept*
/-----
REQUEST:
POST
https://{IP}/+CSCOT+/translation?textdomain=csd&prefix=trans&lang=en-us
HTTP/1.1
Host: {IP}
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9)
Gecko/2008052906 Firefox/3.0 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: https://{IP}/CACHE/sdesktop/install/start.htm
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=UTF-8
Cookie: webvpnLang=en-us; webvpnlogin=1
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 56
Starting, please wait..."><script>alert(1);</script>
RESPONSE:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Cisco AWARE 2.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 14:14:07 GMT
Content-Length: 122
trans["Starting, please wait...\"><script>alert(1);</script>"] =
"Starting, please wait...\"><script>alert(1);</script>";
- -----/
9. *Report Timeline*
. 2010-01-12:
Vendor contacted.
. 2010-01-12:
Cisco replies, saying that it will investigate the report.
. 2010-01-12:
Cisco tentatively acknowledges the February 5th release date.
. 2010-01-13:
Core replies, reassuring that the release date can be moved if Cisco
can't meet it.
. 2010-01-13:
Cisco updates, pointing to a beta version of Cisco Secure Desktop that
contains a fix for the vulnerability.
. 2010-01-13:
Cisco describes the fix and the non-vulnerable versions of the package.
. 2010-01-14:
Cisco confirms the February 5th release date.
. 2010-01-14:
Core acknowledges this release date.
. 2010-01-25:
Core asks for clarification on the non-vulnerable versions of the package.
. 2010-01-25:
Cisco replies with the non-vulnerable version of Cisco Secure Desktop.
. 2010-01-26:
Given that the non-vulnerable version of Cisco Secure Desktop has
already been released, Core requests to move the release date forward,
to February 1st.
. 2010-01-26:
Cisco agrees to move the release date forward.
. 2010-02-01:
The advisory CORE-2010-0106 is published.
10. *About CoreLabs*
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs.
11. *About Core Security Technologies*
Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help
security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a
proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship
product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing
enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,
endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are
exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security
investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security
Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class
security consulting services, including penetration testing and software
security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core
Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at
http://www.coresecurity.com.
12. *Disclaimer*
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely
provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit
is given.
13. *PGP/GPG Keys*
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.
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Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco IronPort
Encryption Appliance
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100210-ironport
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 February 10 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance devices contain two
vulnerabilities that allow remote, unauthenticated access to any file
on the device and one vulnerability that allows remote,
unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary code with elevated
privileges. There are workarounds available to mitigate these
vulnerabilities.
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100210-ironport.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance versions are
affected by these vulnerabilities:
â?¢ Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance 6.5 versions prior to 6.5.2
â?¢ Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance 6.2 versions prior to 6.2.9.1
â?¢ Cisco IronPort PostX MAP versions prior to 6.2.9.1
The version of software that is running on a Cisco IronPort
Encryption Appliance is located on the "About" page of the Cisco
IronPort Encryption Appliance administration interface.
Note: Customers should contact IronPort support to determine which
software fixes are applicable for their environment. Please consult
the Obtaining Fixed Software section of this advisory for more
information.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
Cisco IronPort C, M, and S-Series appliances are not affected by
these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to
be affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
Note: IronPort tracks bugs using an internal system that is not
available to customers. The IronPort bug tracking identifiers are
provided for reference only.
The Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance contains two information
disclosure vulnerabilities that allow remote, unauthenticated access
to arbitrary files on vulnerable devices via the embedded HTTPS
server. The first vulnerability affecting the Cisco IronPort
Encryption Appliance administration interface is documented in
IronPort bug 65921 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2010-0143. The second vulnerability
affecting the WebSafe servlet is documented in IronPort bug 65922 and
has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
identifier CVE-2010-0144.
The Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance contains a remote code
execution vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker to
run arbitrary code with elevated privileges on vulnerable devices via
the embedded HTTPS server. The vulnerability is documented in
IronPort bug 65923 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2010-0145.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
IronPort Bug 65921 - Arbitrary File Access Through Administrative Interface
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
IronPort Bug 65922 - WebSafe DistributorServlet Allows Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Access
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
IronPort Bug 65923 - Default Config Allows Unauthenticated Remote Arbitrary Code
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow a remote,
unauthenticated attacker to access arbitrary files or execute
arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
Workarounds
===========
It is possible to mitigate the administration interface file access
vulnerability (IronPort Bug 65921) by using the IP address
restriction feature of the administration interface to limit access
to trusted hosts. Access to the administration interface is not
restricted by default. To configure access limits, an administrator
should navigate to "Configuration -> Web Services -> Admin -> Console
Security" area in the Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance
administration interface.
It is possible to workaround the remote code execution vulnerability
(IronPort Bug 65923) by disabling HTTP Invoker in the Cisco IronPort
Encryption Appliance configuration files. To disable the HTTP
Invoker, an administrator must delete several files in the PostX
application home directory and remove a directive from the web server
configuration. The following files must be deleted:
jboss/server/postx/deploy/http-invoker.sar
jboss/server/postx/deploy/jms/jbossmq-httpil.sar
The following directive must be removed from the
"jboss/server/postx/conf/jboss-service.xml web" server configuration
file.
<mbean code="org.jboss.varia.deployment.BeanShellSubDeployer"
name="jboss.scripts:service=BSHDeployer">
</mbean>
After deleting the files and removing the directive from the
configuration file, the PostX application service must be restarted.
Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco
devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied
Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100210-ironport.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. The affected products in this advisory are directly
supported by Cisco IronPort. Customers should contact Cisco IronPort
technical support at the link below to obtain software fixes. Cisco
IronPort technical support will assist customers in determining the
correct fixes and installation procedures. Customers should direct
all warranty questions to IronPort technical support.
Note: Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for
software upgrades.
http://www.ironport.com/support/contact_support.html
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
These vulnerabilities were discovered and reported to Cisco by Jesse
Michael and Alexander Senkevitch of Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Illinois. Cisco would like to thank Jesse and Alexander for reporting
these vulnerabilities to us and for working with us on a coordinated
disclosure.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100210-ironport.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
â?¢ cust-security-announce@cisco.com
â?¢ first-bulletins@lists.first.org
â?¢ bugtraq@securityfocus.com
â?¢ vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
â?¢ cisco@spot.colorado.edu
â?¢ cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
â?¢ full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
â?¢ comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â?¬â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â?¬â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??â??
â?? Revision â?? â?? Initial â??
â?? 1.0 â?? 2010-FEB-10 â?? public â??
â?? â?? â?? release â??
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Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Security
Agent
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100217-csa
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 February 17 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is affected by a
directory traversal vulnerability and a SQL injection vulnerability.
Successful exploitation of the directory traversal vulnerability may
allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files
from the server hosting the Management Center. Successful
exploitation of the SQL injection vulnerability may allow an
authenticated attacker to execute SQL statements that can cause
instability of the product or changes in the configuration.
Additionally, the Cisco Security Agent is affected by a denial of
service (DoS) vulnerability. Successful exploitation of the Cisco
Security Agent agent DoS vulnerability may cause the affected system
to crash. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS
condition.
These vulnerabilities are independent of each other.
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Cisco Security Agent releases 5.1, 5.2 and 6.0 are affected by the
SQL injection vulnerability. Only Cisco Security Agent release 6.0 is
affected by the directory traversal vulnerability. Only Cisco
Security Agent release 5.2 is affected by the DoS vulnerability.
Note: Only the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is
affected by the directory traversal and SQL injection
vulnerabilities. The agents installed on user end-points are not
affected.
Only Cisco Security Agent release 5.2 for Windows and Linux, either
managed or standalone, are affected by the DoS vulnerability.
Standalone agents are installed in the following products:
* Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CallManager)
* Cisco Conference Connection (CCC)
* Emergency Responder
* IPCC Express
* IPCC Enterprise
* IPCC Hosted
* IP Interactive Voice Response (IP IVR)
* IP Queue Manager
* Intelligent Contact Management (ICM)
* Cisco Voice Portal (CVP)
* Cisco Unified Meeting Place
* Cisco Personal Assistant (PA)
* Cisco Unity
* Cisco Unity Connection
* Cisco Unity Bridge
* Cisco Secure ACS Solution Engine
* Cisco Internet Service Node (ISN)
* Cisco Security Manager (CSM)
Note: The Sun Solaris version of the Cisco Security Agent is not
affected by these vulnerabilities.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
The Sun Solaris version of Cisco Security Agent is not affected by
these vulnerabilities.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
The Cisco Security Agent is a security software agent that provides
threat protection for server and desktop computing systems. Cisco
Security Agents can be standalone agents or can be managed by the
Cisco Security Agent Management Center.
The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is affected by a
directory traversal vulnerability and a SQL injection vulnerability.
Management Center for Cisco Security Agents Directory Traversal Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is affected by a
directory traversal vulnerability that may allow an authenticated
attacker to view and download arbitrary files from the server that is
hosting the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtd73275 and has
been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier
CVE-2010-0146.
Management Center for Cisco Security Agents SQL Injection Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is also affected by a
SQL injection vulnerability that may allow an authenticated attacker
to execute SQL statements that can cause the Management Center for
Cisco Security Agents to become unstable or modify its configuration.
These configuration changes may result in modifications to the
security policies of the endpoints. Additionally, an attacker may
create, delete, or modify management user accounts that are found in
the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtd73290 and has been
assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier
CVE-2010-0147.
Cisco Security Agent Denial of Service Vulnerability
+---------------------------------------------------
Cisco Security Agent is affected by a DoS vulnerability that could
allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause a system to crash by
sending a series of TCP packets.
Note: Only Cisco Security Agent release 5.2 is affected by the DoS
vulnerability. The Sun Solaris version of the Cisco Security Agent is
not affected by these vulnerabilities.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtb89870 and has
been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier
CVE-2010-0148.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCtd73275 - Directory Traversal in the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents
CVSS Base Score - 6.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCtd73290 - Management Center for Cisco Security Agents: SQL Injection
CVSS Base Score - 9
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCtb89870 - Kernel Panic When Receiving Certain TCP Packets
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the directory traversal vulnerability may
allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files
from the server that is hosting the Management Center for Cisco
Security Agents.
Successful exploitation of the SQL injection vulnerability may allow
an authenticated attacker to execute SQL statements that can cause
the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents to become unstable or
modify its configuration.
Successful exploitation of the Cisco Security Agent DoS vulnerability
may cause the affected system to crash. Repeated exploitation could
result in a sustained DoS condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
+-----------------------------------------------------+
| | Cisco | First | |
| Vulnerability | Security | Fixed | Recommended |
| | Agent | Version | Release |
| | Release | | |
|---------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 5.1 | Not | Not |
| | | vulnerable | vulnerable |
|Directory |----------+------------+-------------|
| Traversal | 5.2 | Not | Not |
| Vulnerability | | vulnerable | vulnerable |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 |
|---------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 5.1 | 5.1.0.117 | 5.1.0.117 |
|SQL Injection |----------+------------+-------------|
| Vulnerability | 5.2 | 5.2.0.296 | 5.2.0.296 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 |
|---------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 5.1 | Not | 5.1.0.117 |
| | | vulnerable | |
|Denial of |----------+------------+-------------|
| Service | 5.2 | 5.2.0.285 | 5.2.0.296 |
|Vulnerability |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 6.0 | Not | 6.0.1.132 |
| | | vulnerable | |
+-----------------------------------------------------+
Cisco CSA software can be downloaded from the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278065206
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds available to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within
the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion
document for this Advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100217-csa.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for
software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.
Refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
The directory traversal and SQL injection vulnerabilities were
discovered and reported to Cisco by Gabriele Giuseppini from Cigital.
Cisco PSIRT appreciates the opportunity to work with researchers on
security vulnerabilities and welcomes the opportunity to review and
assist in product reports. The DoS vulnerability was found during
internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | public |
| | | release. |
+----------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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--- Begin Message ---
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Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA 5500
Series Adaptive Security Appliances
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100217-asa
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 February 17 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the
following vulnerabilities:
* TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
* Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service
Vulnerabilities
* Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) Inspection Denial of
Service Vulnerability
* WebVPN Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Denial of Service
Vulnerability
* Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability
* Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service
Vulnerability
* NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) Authentication Bypass
Vulnerability
These vulnerabilities are not interdependent; a release that is affected
by one vulnerability is not necessarily affected by the others.
There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this
advisory.
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by
multiple vulnerabilities. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software
vary depending on the specific vulnerability. For specific version
information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this
advisory.
TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP
connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted)
that can be triggered through the receipt of specific TCP segments
during the TCP connection termination phase. Appliances that are running
versions 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected when they
are configured for any of the following features:
* SSL VPNs
* Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) Administrative
Access
* Telnet Access
* SSH Access
* Virtual Telnet
* Virtual HTTP
* Transport Layer Security (TLS) Proxy for Encrypted Voice
Inspection
SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
+-----------------------------------------------
Two denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities affect the SIP inspection
feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions
7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP
inspection is enabled by default.
To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy |
include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample
output is displayed in the following example:
ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip
Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0
Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a
configuration similar to the following:
class-map inspection_default
match default-inspection-traffic
!
policy-map global_policy
class inspection_default
...
inspect sip
...
!
service-policy global_policy global
SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------
A denial of service vulnerability affects the SCCP inspection feature of
the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 8.0.x,
8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default.
To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy |
include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample
output is displayed in the following example:
ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny
Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0
Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a
configuration similar to the following:
class-map inspection_default
match default-inspection-traffic
!
policy-map global_policy
class inspection_default
...
inspect skinny
...
!
service-policy global_policy global
WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by a
denial of service vulnerability that exists when WebVPN and DTLS are
enabled. Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and
8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface
name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled
by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn"
configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an
example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS:
webvpn
enable outside
svc enable
...
!
group-policy <group name> internal
group-policy <group name> attributes
...
webvpn
svc dtls enable
...
Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in
recent software releases.
Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by a
denial of service vulnerability that can be triggered by a malformed TCP
segment that transits the appliance. This vulnerability only affects
configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static
statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must
also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System
(IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by
using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class"
configuration mode. Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances
that are running software versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x,
and 8.2.x are affected.
Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
A crafted IKE message that is sent through an IPsec tunnel that
terminates on a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance
could cause all IPsec tunnels that terminate on the same device to be
torn down. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are
affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp
enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration.
NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------------
An authentication bypass vulnerability affects Cisco ASA 5500 Series
Adaptive Security Appliances when NTLMv1 authentication is configured.
Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected.
Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that
uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag>
protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires
authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1
authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server
protocol nt" command. Sample output is displayed in the following
example:
ciscoasa#show aaa-server protocol nt
Server Group: test
Server Protocol: nt
Server Address: 192.168.10.11
Server port: 139
Server status: ACTIVE, Last transaction (success) at 11:10:08 UTC Fri Jan 29
<output truncated>
Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance Vulnerability Status
+-----------------------------------------------------------
Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances are affected by the
following vulnerabilities:
* TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
* SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
* SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
* Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability
* NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
Because the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances reached End of
Software Maintenance Releases on July 28, 2009, no further software
releases will be available for the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security
Appliances. Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances customers are
encouraged to migrate to Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security
Appliances or to implement any applicable workarounds that are listed
in the "Workarounds" section of this advisory. Fixed software is
available for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances.
For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html.
How To Determine The Running Software Version
+--------------------------------------------
To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is
running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version"
command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running
software version 8.0(4):
ASA#show version
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4)
Device Manager Version 6.0(1)
<output truncated>
Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software
version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left
corner of the Cisco ASDM window.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by
some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate
Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the
vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml.
With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are
currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
The Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is a modular
platform that provides security and VPN services. It offers firewall,
intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services.
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the
following vulnerabilities:
TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP
connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted)
when specific TCP segments are received during the TCP connection
termination phase.
This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent
to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance.
Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way
handshake, authentication is not required.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsz77717 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0149.
SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
+-----------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by two
denial of service vulnerabilities that may cause an appliance to reload
during the processing of SIP messages. Appliances are only vulnerable
when SIP inspection is enabled.
Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is
destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCsy91157,
and CSCtc96018, and have been assigned CVE IDs CVE-2010-0150, and
CVE-2010-0569 respectively.
SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by
a vulnerability that may cause the appliance to reload during the
processing of malformed skinny control message. Appliances are only
vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled.
Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is
destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsz79757 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0151.
WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by a
vulnerability that may cause the appliance to reload when a malformed
DTLS message is sent to the DTLS port (by default UDP port 443).
Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and
DTLS transport.
This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the
appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtb64913 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0565.
Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by a
vulnerability that may cause an appliance to reload when all of the
following conditions are met:
1. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received.
2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the
"nailed" option configured on it.
3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is
configured for inline mode of operation.
A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this
vulnerability.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtb37219 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0566.
Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances contain a
vulnerability that may cause all IPsec tunnels terminating on
the appliance to be torn down and prevent new tunnels from being
established. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic
will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey
will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and
remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The vulnerability is triggered
when the appliance processes a malformed IKE message on port UDP 4500
that traverses an existing IPsec tunnel. The only way to recover and
re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance.
When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will
generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by
the loss of IPsec peers.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtc47782 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0567.
NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------------
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances contain a
vulnerability that could result in authentication bypass when the
affected appliance is configured to authenticate users against Microsoft
Windows servers using the NTLMv1 protocol.
Users can bypass authentication by providing an an invalid, crafted
username during an authentication request. Any services that use a
AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication
protocol is affected. Affected services include:
* Telnet access to the security appliance
* SSH access to the security appliance
* HTTPS access to the security appliance (including Cisco ASDM
access)
* Serial console access
* Privileged (enable) mode access
* Cut-through proxy for network access
* VPN access
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte21953 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0568.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.
TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------------
* CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely")
CVSS Base Score - 7.1
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Medium
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
+-----------------------------------------------
* CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic")
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic")
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------
* CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny
inspect enabled")
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
* CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put")
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
* CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed
option on static")
CVSS Base Score - 7.1
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Medium
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
* CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail")
CVSS Base Score - 5.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Partial
CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------------
* CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for
NT auth")
CVSS Base Score - 7.1
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Medium
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------------
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion
condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP
connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the
TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used
for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console
connection may be needed to access to the appliance.
SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
+-----------------------------------------------
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of
the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a
sustained DoS condition.
SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of
the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a
sustained DoS condition.
WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of
the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a
sustained DoS condition.
Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of
the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a
sustained DoS condition.
Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause all IPsec
VPN tunnels (LAN-to-LAN or remote) that terminate on the security
appliance to be torn down and prevent new tunnels from being
established. A manual reload of the appliance is required to
re-establish all VPN tunnels.
NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------------
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in
unauthorized access to the network or appliance.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
The following table contains the first fixed software release of each
vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in
a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be
vulnerable.
+---------------------------------------+
| | Major | First |
| Vulnerability | Release | Fixed |
| | | Release |
|-----------------+---------+-----------|
| | 7.0 | Not |
| | | affected |
|TCP Connection |---------+-----------|
| Exhaustion | 7.2 | 7.2(4.46) |
|Denial of |---------+-----------|
| Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) |
|Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------|
| CSCsz77717) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 8.2 | 8.2(1.5) |
|-----------------+---------+-----------|
| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) |
|SIP Inspection |---------+-----------|
| Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) |
|Service |---------+-----------|
| Vulnerabilities | 8.0 | 8.0(5.2) |
|(CSCsy91157 and |---------+-----------|
| CSCtc96018) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 8.2 | 8.2(1.16) |
|-----------------+---------+-----------|
| | 7.0 | Not |
| | | affected |
| |---------+-----------|
| SCCP Inspection | 7.2 | Not |
| Denial of | | affected |
|Service |---------+-----------|
| Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) |
|CSCsz79757) |---------+-----------|
| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 8.2 | 8.2(1.2) |
|-----------------+---------+-----------|
| | 7.0 | Not |
| | | affected |
|WebVPN DTLS |---------+-----------|
| Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) |
|Service |---------+-----------|
| Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) |
|CSCtb64913) |---------+-----------|
| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) |
|-----------------+---------+-----------|
| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) |
| |---------+-----------|
| Crafted TCP | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) |
|Segment Denial |---------+-----------|
| of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) |
|Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------|
| CSCtb37219) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) |
|-----------------+---------+-----------|
| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) |
| |---------+-----------|
| Crafted IKE | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) |
|Message Denial |---------+-----------|
| of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(5.1) |
|Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------|
| CSCtc47782) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 8.2 | 8.2(1.15) |
|-----------------+---------+-----------|
| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) |
| |---------+-----------|
| NTLMv1 | 8.0 | 8.0(5.7) |
|Authentication |---------+-----------|
| Bypass | | 8.1 |
| Vulnerability ( | | (2.40), |
| CSCte21953) | 8.1 | available |
| | | early |
| | | March |
| | | 2010 |
| |---------+-----------|
| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.1) |
+---------------------------------------+
Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the
vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software
versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End
of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Refer to the EOL/EOS for the
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance Software v7.1 notice
for further information.
Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2
Recommended Releases
+-------------------
Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early
March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain
the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends
upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended
releases.
Workarounds
===========
TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------------
It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability for TCP-based services
that are offered to known clients. For example, it may be possible to
restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to
known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access
SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no
mitigations exist.
SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
+-----------------------------------------------
These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it
is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing
the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within
policy-map configuration.
SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------
This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it
is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing
the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within
the policy-map configuration.
WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport
for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc
dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the
corresponding group policy.
Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following:
* Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass.
* Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be
configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class"
configuration mode.
* Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries.
* If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard
static NAT entries.
Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
A workaround for this vulnerability is to prevent UDP port 4500 traffic
from ever traversing IPsec tunnels terminating on the Cisco ASA 5500
Series Adaptive Security Appliance. This may be feasible since in most
cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels.
Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be
accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example:
!-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else
access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500
access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any
!-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the
!-- previous ACL
group-policy VPNPOL internal
group-policy VPNPOL attributes
vpn-filter value VPNFILTER
!-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group
tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes
default-group-policy VPNPOL
For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be
applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access
(tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups.
Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this
workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send
traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic
from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server
will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the
filter used in this workaround.
For a more comprehensive example of the VPN filter feature of the Cisco
ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, refer to the whitepaper
"PIX/ASA 7.x and Later: VPN Filter (Permit Specific Port or Protocol)
Configuration Example for L2L and Remote Access" available at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00808c9a87.shtml
In addition, if the security appliance does not terminate any tunnels,
the vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling IKE by issuing the "no
isakmp enable <interface name>" command.
NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------------
If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this
vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other
authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible
to mitigate the vulnerability.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------------
This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of a customer
service request.
SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
+-----------------------------------------------
CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was
discovered during the resolution of customer service requests.
SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
+----------------------------------------------
This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer
service requests.
WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer
service requests.
Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing.
Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------
This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer
service requests.
NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------------
This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485
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Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Firewall Services Module Skinny Client
Control Protocol Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 February 17 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
A vulnerability exists in the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for
the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers
that may cause the Cisco FWSM to reload after processing a malformed
Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) message. The vulnerability exists
when SCCP inspection is enabled.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
All non-fixed 4.x versions of Cisco FWSM Software are affected by this
vulnerability if SCCP inspection is enabled. SCCP inspection is enabled
by default.
To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy
| include skinny" command and confirm that the command returns output.
Example output follows:
fwsm#show service-policy | include skinny
Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0
Alternatively, a device that has SCCP inspection enabled has a
configuration similar to the following:
class-map inspection_default
match default-inspection-traffic
!
policy-map global_policy
class inspection_default
...
inspect skinny
...
!
service-policy global_policy global
To determine the version of Cisco FWSM Software that is running, issue
the "show module" command-line interface (CLI) command from Cisco IOS
Software or Cisco Catalyst Operating System Software to identify what
modules and sub modules are installed on the system.
The following example shows a system with a Cisco FWSM (WS-SVC-FWM-1)
installed in slot 2:
switch>show module
Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No.
--- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ -----------
1 16 SFM-capable 16 port 1000mb GBIC WS-X6516-GBIC SAL06334NS9
2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485
3 8 Intrusion Detection System WS-SVC-IDSM-2 SAD0932089Z
4 4 SLB Application Processor Complex WS-X6066-SLB-APC SAD093004BD
5 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3B SAL0934888E
Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status
--- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ -------
1 0009.11e3.ade8 to 0009.11e3.adf7 5.1 6.3(1) 8.5(0.46)RFW Ok
2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok
3 0014.a90c.9956 to 0014.a90c.995d 5.0 7.2(1) 5.1(6)E1 Ok
4 0014.a90c.66e6 to 0014.a90c.66ed 1.7 4.2(3) Ok
5 0013.c42e.7fe0 to 0013.c42e.7fe3 4.4 8.1(3) 12.2(18)SXF1 Ok
[...]
After locating the correct slot, issue the "show module <slot number>"
command to identify the software version that is running. Example output
follows:
switch>show module 2
Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No.
--- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ -----------
2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485
Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status
--- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ -------
2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok
[...]
The preceding example shows that the FWSM is running software version
3.2(2)10 as indicated by the column under "Sw."
Note: Recent versions of Cisco IOS Software will show the software
version of each module in the output from the "show module" command;
therefore, executing the "show module <slot number>" command is not
necessary.
If a Virtual Switching System (VSS) is used to allow two physical Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series Switches to operate as a single logical virtual
switch, the "show module switch all" command can display the software
version of all FWSMs that belong to switch 1 and switch 2. The output
from this command will be similar to the output from the "show module
<slot number>" but will include module information for the modules in
each switch in the VSS.
Alternatively, version information can be obtained directly from the
FWSM through the "show version" command. Example output follows:
FWSM> show version
FWSM Firewall Version 3.2(2)10
[...]
Customers who use the Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) to
manage their devices can find the version of the software displayed in
the table in the login window or in the upper left corner of the ASDM
window. The version notation is similar to the following example.
FWSM Version: 3.2(2)10
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
The Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected
by the vulnerability in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security
Advisory has been published to disclose this and other
vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive
Security Appliances. The advisory is available at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml
With the exception of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security
Appliances, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected
by this vulnerability.
Details
=======
The Cisco FWSM is a high-speed, integrated firewall module for Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers. The FWSM
offers firewall services with stateful packet filtering and deep packet
inspection.
The Cisco FWSM is affected by a vulnerability that may cause the device
to reload during the processing of a malformed SCCP message when SCCP
inspection is enabled.
This vulnerability is only triggered by transit traffic; traffic that is
destined to the device does not trigger this vulnerability.
This issue is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtb60485 and has been
assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0151.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* CSCtb60485 ("Traceback in 'skinny' Thread with Skinny Inspection Enabled")
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of
the affected device. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained
denial of service condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco FWSM Software table below describes a major Cisco
FWSM Software train and the earliest possible release within that train
that contains the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated
date of availability (if not currently available) in the "First Fixed
Release" column. A device running a release that is earlier than the
release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is
known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the
indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First
Fixed Release label).
+---------------------------------------+
| Major Release | First Fixed Release |
|----------------+----------------------|
| 3.1 | Not affected |
|----------------+----------------------|
| 3.2 | Not affected |
|----------------+----------------------|
| 4.0 | 4.0(8) |
+---------------------------------------+
Fixed Cisco FWSM Software can be downloaded from the Software Center on
Cisco.com by visiting http://www.cisco.com/cisco/web/download/index.html
and navigating to "Security > Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Firewall
Services Module > Firewall Services Module (FWSM) Software".
Workarounds
===========
If SCCP inspection is not required, this vulnerability can be mitigated
by disabling it. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing
the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within
the policy map configuration. If SCCP inspection is required, there are
no workarounds.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer
service requests.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111553
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Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Denial
of Service Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100303-cucm
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 March 3 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Unified Communications Manager (formerly Cisco CallManager)
contains multiple denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities that if
exploited could cause an interruption of voice services. The Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP), Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) and
Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) Manager services are affected by
these vulnerabilities.
To address these vulnerabilities, Cisco has released free software
updates for select Cisco Unified Communications Manager versions.
There is a workaround for of one the vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-cucm.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following products are affected by vulnerabilities that are
described in this advisory:
* Cisco Unified Communications Manager 4.x
* Cisco Unified Communications Manager 5.x
* Cisco Unified Communications Manager 6.x
* Cisco Unified Communications Manager 7.x
Note: Cisco Unified Communications Manager version 5.1 reached the
End of Software Maintenance on February 13, 2010. For customers using
Cisco Unified Communications Manager 5.x versions, please contact
your Cisco support team for assistance in upgrading to a supported
version of Cisco Unified Communications Manager.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
Cisco Unified Communications Manager version 8.0(1) and Cisco Unified
Communications Manager Express are not affected by these
vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be
affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
Cisco Unified Communications Manager is the call processing component
of the Cisco IP Telephony solution that extends enterprise telephony
features and functions to packet telephony network devices, such as
IP phones, media processing devices, VoIP gateways, and multimedia
applications.
Malformed SCCP Message Vulnerabilities
+-------------------------------------
Cisco Unified Communications Manager contains two DoS vulnerabilities
that involve the processing of SCCP packets. Each vulnerability is
triggered by a malformed SCCP message that could cause a critical
process to fail, which could result in the disruption of voice
services. All SCCP ports (TCP ports 2000 and 2443) are affected.
The first SCCP DoS vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID
CSCtc38985 and has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0587.
This vulnerability is fixed in Cisco Unified Communications Manager
versions 4.3(2)SR2, 6.1(5), 7.1(3a)su1 and 8.0(1).
The second SCCP DoS vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID
CSCtc47823 and has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0588.
This vulnerability is fixed in Cisco Unified Communications Manager
versions 6.1(5), 7.1(3a)su1 and 8.0(1). Cisco Unified Communications
Manager 4.x versions are not affected.
Malformed SIP Message Vulnerabilities
+------------------------------------
Cisco Unified Communications Manager contains two DoS vulnerabilities
that involve the processing of SIP messages. Each vulnerability is
triggered by a malformed SIP message that could cause a critical
process to fail, which could result in the disruption of voice
services. All SIP ports (TCP ports 5060 and 5061, UDP ports 5060 and
5061) are affected.
The first SIP DoS vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID
CSCtc37188 and has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0590.
This vulnerability is fixed in Cisco Unified Communications Manager
versions 7.1(3a)su1 and 8.0(1) . Cisco Unified Communications Manager
4.x and 6.x versions are not affected.
The second SIP DoS vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID
CSCtc62362 and has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0591.
The second vulnerability is fixed in Cisco Unified Communications Manager
versions 6.1(5), 7.1(3b)SU2 and 8.0(1). Cisco Unified Communications
Manager 4.x versions are not affected.
Malformed CTI Manager Message Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
The CTI Manager service of Cisco Unified Communications Manager
contains a DoS vulnerability. A malformed message sent to the CTI
Manager service port (TCP 2748) could cause the CTI Manager service
to fail, which could result in the interruption of CTI applications.
The CTI Manager service is disabled by default.
The CTI Manager vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID
CSCsu31800 and has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0592.
This vulnerability is fixed in Cisco Unified Communications Manager
versions 4.3(2)sr1a, 6.1(3), 7.0(2), 7.1(2) and 8.0(1).
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCtc38985 - CCM Coredump on SCCP StationCapabilitiesRes Message with MaxCap Exceeded
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCtc47823 - CCM Core at invalid Line# in SCCP RegAvailableLines and FwdStatReq
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCtc37188 - CMSIPUtility Coredump on Fuzzed Register Message
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCtc62362 - CCM Coredump on Overflow of Field Telephone-URL in REG Msg
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsu31800 - CTI crash with invalid packet
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities that are described in
this advisory could result in the interruption of voice services. An
affected Cisco Unified Communications Manager services may require a
manual restart to restore voice services.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a
complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
+---------------------------------------+
| Cisco Unified | |
| Communications | Recommended Release |
| Manager | |
| Version | |
|----------------+----------------------|
| 4.x | 4.3(2)SR2 |
|----------------+----------------------|
| | Cisco Unified |
| | Communications |
| | Manager version 5.1 |
| 5.x | reached the End of |
| | Software Maintenance |
| | on February 13, |
| | 2010. |
|----------------+----------------------|
| 6.x | 6.1(5) |
|----------------+----------------------|
| 7.x | 7.1(3b)SU2 |
|----------------+----------------------|
| | Cisco Unified |
| | Communications |
| | Manager version 8.0 |
| | (1) was distributed |
| 8.x | with software fixes |
| | for all the |
| | vulnerabilities that |
| | are described in |
| | this advisory. |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Unified Communications Manager software version 4.3(2)SR2 can
be downloaded at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/PlatformList.x?sftType=Unified+Communications+Manager+Updates&mdfid=280771554&treeName=Voice+and+Unified+Communications&mdfLevel=Software%20Version/Option&url=null&modelName=Cisco+Unified+Communications+Manager+Version+4.3&isPlatform=N&treeMdfId=278875240&modifmdfid=null&imname=&hybrid=Y&imst=N
Cisco Unified Communications Manager software version 6.1(5) can be
downloaded at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/ReleaseType.x?optPlat=&isPlatform=Y&mdfid=281023410&sftType=Unified+Communications+Manager+Updates&treeName=Voice+and+Unified+Communications&modelName=Cisco+Unified+Communications+Manager+Version+6.1&mdfLevel=Software%20Version/Option&treeMdfId=278875240&modifmdfid=null&imname=&hybrid=Y&imst=N
Cisco Unified Communications Manager software version 7.1(3b)SU2 can
be downloaded at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/PlatformList.x?sftType=Unified+Communications+Manager+Updates&mdfid=282421166&treeName=Voice+and+Unified+Communications&mdfLevel=Software%20Version/Option&url=null&modelName=Cisco+Unified+Communications+Manager+Version+7.1&isPlatform=N&treeMdfId=278875240&modifmdfid=null&imname=&hybrid=Y&imst=N
Workarounds
===========
Administrators can mitigate the SCCP- and SIP-related vulnerabilities
by implementing filtering on screening devices to permit access to
TCP ports 2000 and 2443, and TCP and UDP ports 5060 and 5061 only
from networks that require SCCP and SIP access to Cisco Unified
Communications Manager appliances.
It is possible to mitigate the CTI Manager vulnerability by disabling
the CTI Manager service t is not necessary; however, this workaround
will interrupt applications that reply on the CTI Manager service.
Administrators can also mitigate the vulnerability by implementing
filtering on screening devices to permit access to TCP port 2748 only
from networks that require access to the CTI Manager service. Please
consult the following documentation for details on disabling Cisco
Unified Communications Manager services:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/service/6_0_1/admin/sasrvact.html#wp1048390
Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco
devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied
Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100303-cucm.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for
software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.
Refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
The vulnerability documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc38985 was reported
to Cisco by the Sipera VIPER Lab. Cisco would like to thank Sipera
VIPER Lab team for reporting this vulnerability to us and for working
with us on a coordinated disclosure.
All other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were discovered
as a result of internal testing conducted by Cisco.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-cucm.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2010-March-03 | public |
| | | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Digital
Media Manager
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100303-dmm
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmm.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 March 03 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco Digital Media Manager
(DMM). This security advisory outlines details of the following
vulnerabilities:
* Default credentials
* Privilege escalation vulnerability
* Information leakage vulnerability
These vulnerabilities are independent of each other.
There are no workarounds that can mitigate any of these vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmm.shtml.
Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with
a vulnerability disclosure advisory that impacts the
Cisco Digital Media Player. This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmp.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following is a list of the products affected by each vulnerability
as described in detail within this advisory.
Default Credentials
+------------------
Cisco DMM versions 5.0.x and 5.1.x are affected by this vulnerability.
Cisco DMM versions 4.x are not vulnerable.
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
+---------------------------------
Cisco DMM versions 5.0.x and 5.1.x are affected by this vulnerability.
Cisco DMM versions 4.x are not vulnerable.
Information Leakage Vulnerability
+--------------------------------
All Cisco DMM releases earler than 5.2 are affected by this
vulnerability.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
The Cisco DMM is used to manage, schedule, and publish digital media for
Cisco Digital Signs, Cisco Cast and Cisco Show and Share. This security
advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities in the Cisco DMM.
These vulnerabilities are independent of each other.
Default Credentials
+------------------
Cisco DMM versions earler than 5.2 have default credentials that could
allow an attacker full control of the installed web applications,
including settings, status, and deployment.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCta03378 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier
CVE-2010-0570.
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
+---------------------------------
A vulnerability exists in Cisco DMM versions 5.0.x and 5.1.x that could
allow authenticated, but unauthorized users to change the configuration
and obtain full access of the device.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc46008 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier
CVE-2010-0571.
Information Leakage Vulnerability
+--------------------------------
The Cisco DMM can be used to manage the Cisco Digital Media Player.
The Cisco Digital Media Player is an IP-based endpoint that can play
high-definition live and on-demand video, motion graphics, web pages,
and dynamic content on digital displays.
A vulnerability exists in all Cisco DMM versions earler than 5.2 that
could allow authenticated but unauthorized users to view Cisco Digital
Media Player user credentials and LDAP credentials (if configured) in
error log messages and stack traces.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc46050 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier
CVE-2010-0572.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* CSCta03378 ("Default password for Tomcat administration account")
CVSS Base Score - 10.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* CSCtc46008 ("Privilege Escalation on DMM")
CVSS Base Score - 8.5
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Medium
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* CSCtc46050 ("Potential Information Leakage within Stack Trace")
CVSS Base Score - 7.1
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - High
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the default credentials vulnerability could
allow an attacker to change the settings, status, and deployment of the
installed web applications.
Successful exploitation of the privilege escalation vulnerability could
allow authenticated, but unauthorized users to change the configuration
and obtain full access of the device.
Successful exploitation of the information leakage vulnerability could
allow authenticated but unauthorized users to view Cisco Digital Media
Player user credentials and LDAP credentials (if configured) in error
log messages and stack traces.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
All of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory have been
fixed in Cisco DMM version 5.2.
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds that can mitigate any of these vulnerabilities.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
The privilege escalation and information leakage vulnerabilities were
reported to Cisco by the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance
team. Cisco PSIRT appreciates the opportunity to work with researchers
on security vulnerabilities and welcomes the opportunity to review and
assist in product reports.
The default credentials vulnerability was found during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmm.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2010-March-03 | Initial public release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Mar 03, 2010 Document ID: 111578
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Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Digital Media Player Remote Display
Unauthorized Content Injection Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100303-dmp
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmp.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 March 03 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
A vulnerability exists in the Cisco Digital Media Player that could
allow an unauthenticated attacker to inject video or data content into a
remote display.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. There are no workarounds available to mitigate this
vulnerability.
This additional advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmp.shtml.
Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with
a multiple vulnerability disclosure advisory that impacts
the Cisco Digital Media Manager. This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmm.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Cisco Digital Media Player versions earlier than 5.2 are affected by
this vulnerability.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
Cisco Digital Media Players are IP-based endpoints that can play
high-definition live and on-demand video, motion graphics, web pages,
and dynamic content on digital displays. The Cisco Digital Media Player
contains a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to
inject video or data content into a remote display.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc46024 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier
CVE-2010-0573.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* CSCtc46024 ("Remote Display Unauthorized Content Injection")
CVSS Base Score - 8.5
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - Partial
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.0
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an
unauthenticated attacker to inject video or data content into a remote
display.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
This vulnerability has been fixed in Cisco Digital Media Player version
5.2.
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for
software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by the National Australia
Bank's Security Assurance team. Cisco PSIRT appreciates the opportunity
to work with researchers on security vulnerabilities and welcomes the
opportunity to review and assist in product reports.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100303-dmp.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2010-March-03 | Initial public release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Mar 03, 2010 Document ID: 111581
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