[guru] Cisco biztonsagi frissitesek
DATE: Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:13:37 +0100
Heap overflow-t találtak a Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM,
korábban CallManager) Certificate Trust List (CTL) Provider
(CTLProvider.exe) szolgáltatásában. A hibát kihasználva egy távoli,
autentikálatlan támadó DoS-t indíthat vagy tetszőleges kódot futtathat.
A Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance (PIX) és a Cisco 5500 Series
Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) egy preparált IP csomag segítségével
újratölthető. A hiba egy olyan IP csomaggal kényszeríthető ki, amelyben a
Time-to-Live (TTL) dekrementálás engedélyezve van.
A Cisco Application Velocity System (AVS) 5.1.0 előtti verziói nem
módosíttatják a system account jelszavakat az első konfigurálás során. A
default passwordök segítségével egy támadó teljesen átveheti az irányítást
az AVS felett.
A Cisco kiadta a hibák javítását.
--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified Communications Manager CTL
Provider Heap Overflow
Document ID: 100345
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080116-cucmctl
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080116-cucmctl.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 January 16 1600 UTC (GMT)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM), formerly CallManager,
contains a heap overflow vulnerability in the Certificate Trust List
(CTL) Provider service that could allow a remote, unauthenticated
user to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition or execute
arbitrary code. There is a workaround for this vulnerability.
Cisco has made free software available to address these
vulnerabilities for affected customers.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-0027
has been assigned to this vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080116-cucmctl.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Note: Cisco Unified CallManager Versions 4.2, 4.3, 5.1 and 6.0 have
been renamed as Cisco Unified Communications Manager. CUCM Versions
3.3, 4.0, 4.1 and 5.0 retain the Cisco Unified CallManager name.
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
These products are vulnerable:
* Cisco Unified CallManager 4.0
* Cisco Unified CallManager 4.1 Versions prior to 4.1(3)SR5c
* Cisco Unified Communications Manager 4.2 Versions prior to 4.2(3)
SR3
* Cisco Unified Communications Manager 4.3 Versions prior to 4.3(1)
SR1
The version of software running on a CUCM 4.x system can be
determined by navigating to Help > About Cisco Unified CallManager
and selecting the Details button via the CUCM Administration
interface.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
CUCM Versions 3.3, 5.0, 5.1, 6.0, 6.1 and Cisco CallManager Express
are not affected by this vulnerability. No other Cisco products are
currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Details
=======
Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) is the call processing
component of the Cisco IP telephony solution that extends enterprise
telephony features and functions to packet telephony network devices,
such as IP phones, media processing devices, voice-over-IP (VoIP)
gateways, and multimedia applications.
When a CUCM server is deployed in secure mode, a Certificate Trust
List (CTL) is used by Cisco Unified IP Phone devices to verify the
identity of CUCM servers. The CTL contains public keys and other
information to allow the Cisco IP Phone devices to establish a
trusted relationship with a CUCM server. The CTL is provisioned using
the CTL Provider service on a CUCM server and with the CTL Provider
client on an administrator workstation. The CTL Provider service
needs to be enabled during the initial configuration of a CUCM server
/cluster or when changes are required to the CTL. Please consult the
Workarounds section of this advisory for information on how to
determine if the CTL Provider service is enabled on a CUCM server.
The CTL Provider service of the CUCM contains a heap overflow
vulnerability that could allow a remote, unauthenticated user to
cause a DoS condition or execute arbitrary code. The CTL Provider
service listens on TCP port 2444 by default, but the port can be
modified by the user. This issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID
CSCsj22605.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
Version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCsj22605 - CUCM CTL Provider Heap Overflow Vulnerability
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a DoS
condition or the execution of arbitrary code.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
===========
It is possible to workaround the vulnerability by disabling the CTL
Provider service when not in use. Access to the CTL Provider service
is required for the initial configuration of the CUCM authentication
and encryption features, or during configuration updates. For the
CUCM 4.x systems, please consult the following documentation for
details on how to disable the CUCM services:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/voicesw/ps556/products_administration_guide_chapter09186a008070ec49.html
Filtering traffic to the affected CUCM systems on screening devices
can be used as a mitigation technique for this vulnerability. To
mitigate the CTL Producer service overflow, access to TCP port 2444
should be permitted only between the CUCM servers and administrator
workstations running the CTL Provider client. There is currently no
supported method to configure filtering directly on a CUCM system.
It is possible to change the default ports of the CTL Provider (TCP
port 2444) service. If changed, filtering should be based on the port
value used. The value of the port can be viewed in CUCM
Administration interface by following the System > Service Parameters
menu and selecting the CTL Provider service.
Filters blocking access to TCP port 2444 should be deployed at the
network edge as part of a transit access control list (tACL). Further
information about transit access control lists is available in the
white paper "Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge,"
which is available at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801afc76.shtml
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within
the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin
companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20080116-cucmctl.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for
software upgrades.
Fixed software for CUCM can be obtained here:
+-------------------------------------------------+
| CUCM | Fixed | Recommended | Download |
| Version | Release | Release | Location |
|---------+---------+-------------+---------------|
| | | Upgrade to | |
| CUCM | | a fixed | |
| 4.0 | N/A | Version of | N/A |
| | | CUCM 4.1 or | |
| | | later | |
|---------+---------+-------------+---------------|
| | | | http:// |
| | CUCM | CUCM 4.1(3) | www.cisco.com |
| CUCM | 4.1(3) | SR6 or | /pcgi-bin/ |
| 4.1 | SR5c | later | tablebuild.pl |
| | | | /callmgr-41? |
| | | | psrtdcat20e2 |
|---------+---------+-------------+---------------|
| | | | http:// |
| | CUCM | CUCM 4.2(3) | www.cisco.com |
| CUCM | 4.2(3) | SR3 or | /pcgi-bin/ |
| 4.2 | SR3 | later | tablebuild.pl |
| | | | /callmgr-42? |
| | | | psrtdcat20e2 |
|---------+---------+-------------+---------------|
| | | | http:// |
| | CUCM | CUCM 4.3(1) | www.cisco.com |
| CUCM | 4.3(1) | SR1a or | /pcgi-bin/ |
| 4.3 | SR1 | later | tablebuild.pl |
| | | | /callmgr-43? |
| | | | psrtdcat20e2 |
+-------------------------------------------------+
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by TippingPoint. Cisco would
like to thank TippingPoint for reporting this vulnerability and
working with us towards resolution of this problem.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080116-cucmctl.shtml.
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2008-January-16 | public |
| | | release. |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
TPTI-08-02: Cisco Call Manager CTLProvider Heap Overflow Vulnerability
http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/advisory/TPTI-08-02
January 16, 2008
-- CVE ID:
CVE-2008-0027
-- Affected Vendor:
Cisco
-- Affected Products:
Cisco Call Manager 4.1(3)
-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of Cisco CallManager. Authentication is not
required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the CTL Provider Service,
CTLProvider.exe, which binds to TCP port 2444. The service operates
over a SSL encrypted transport. Due to a logic flaw in the way data is
received in a loop a heap allocation can be arbitrarily overflown
resulting in the control of subsequent heap chunks. This can lead to
arbitrary code execution.
The vulnerability is due to a loop that occurs during receive of socket
data. An initial buffer is allocated at 0x19000 bytes, as can bee seen
here.
.text:00406077 191A8 68+ push 19000h
; size_t
.text:0040607C 191AC FF+ call ds:__imp_malloc
.text:00406082 191AC 83+ add esp, 10h
.text:00406085 1919C 89+ mov [edi+14h], eax
.text:00406088 1919C 85+ test eax, eax
.text:0040608A 1919C 0F+ jz loc_406238
Once allocated data is read in 0x19000 chunks. If more than 0x4000
bytes of data are left on the socket we loop again as can be seen
here.
.text:004060A5 191AC FF+ push dword ptr [ebp-14h]
; size_t
.text:004060A8 191B0 8D+ lea eax, [ebp-1919Ch]
.text:004060AE 191B0 50 push eax
; void *
.text:004060AF 191B4 8B+ mov eax, [edi+14h]
.text:004060B2 191B4 03+ add eax, [ebp-1Ch]
.text:004060B5 191B4 50 push eax
; void *
.text:004060B6 191B8 E8+ call memcpy
.text:004060B6 191B8 2F+
.text:004060BB 191B8 B8+ mov eax, 16384
.text:004060C0 191B8 83+ add esp, 1Ch
.text:004060C3 1919C 39+ cmp [ebp-14h], eax
.text:004060C6 1919C 75+ jnz short loc_4060F8
.text:004060C8 1919C 50 push eax
; int
.text:004060C9 191A0 68+ push offset str__ErrDExceeds16k
; 'err %d exceeds 16K'
.text:004060CE 191A4 8D+ lea eax, [ebp-88h]
.text:004060D4 191A4 68+ push 80000h
; int
.text:004060D9 191A8 50 push eax
; int
.text:004060DA 191AC E8+ call log_message
.text:004060DA 191AC B7+
.text:004060DF 191AC 83+ add esp, 10h
.text:004060E2 1919C 81+ add dword ptr [ebp-1Ch], 4000h
.text:004060E9 1919C 68+ push offset
str__MaybeThereIsMoreData__readAgain ; "Maybe there is more data..Read
again"
.text:004060EE 191A0 68+ push 10000h
.text:004060F3 191A4 E9+ jmp loc_405FFF
This will continue until heap chunks are overwritten at the users
control, which can be exploited to overwrite memory and further lead to
arbitrary code execution.
-- Vendor Response:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080116-cucmctl.shtml
-- Disclosure Timeline:
2007.06.04 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2008.01.16 - Coordinated public release of advisory
-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by Cody Pierce - TippingPoint DVLabs.
--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco PIX and ASA Time-to-Live Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080123-asa
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-asa.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 January 23 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
A crafted IP packet vulnerability exists in the Cisco PIX 500 Series
Security Appliance (PIX) and the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security
Appliance (ASA) that may result in a reload of the device. This
vulnerability is triggered during processing of a crafted IP packet when
the Time-to-Live (TTL) decrement feature is enabled.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-0028 has
been assigned to this vulnerability.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. A workaround that mitigates this vulnerability is
available.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-asa.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The TTL decrement feature was introduced in version 7.2(2) and it is
disabled by default. The Cisco PIX and ASA security appliances running
software versions prior to 7.2(3)006 or 8.0(3) and that have the TTL
decrement feature enabled are vulnerable.
By default the PIX and ASA security appliance software does not
decrement the TTL of transient packets. The ability to decrement the TTL
of transient packets can be enabled on a selective or global basis by
using the set connection decrement-ttl command in the policy-map class
configuration mode. To determine whether you are running this feature
use the show running-config command and search for the set connection
decrement-ttl command. Alternatively you can use the include argument to
search for this command as follows:
ASA#show running-config | include decrement-ttl
set connection decrement-ttl
ASA#
The set connection decrement-ttl command is part of a configured
class-map. In order for this command to take effect it must be applied
using a policy-map (assigned globally or to an interface). For more
information about the Modular Policy Framework on the Cisco ASA and PIX
refer to the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa80/configuration/guide/mpc.html
To determine whether you are running a vulnerable version of Cisco PIX
or ASA software, issue the show version command-line interface (CLI)
command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA Security Appliance that
runs software release 7.2(3):
ASA#show version
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 7.2(3)
[...]
Customers who use the Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) to
manage their devices can find the version of the software displayed in
the table in the login window or in the upper left corner of the ASDM
window. The version notation is similar to the following:
PIX Version 7.2(3)
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
Cisco PIX and ASA security appliances which do not support the TTL
decrement feature or are not explicitly configured for it are not
vulnerable.
Note: The TTL decrement feature was introduced in version 7.2(2), and it
is disabled by default. The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is not
vulnerable.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
A crafted IP packet vulnerability exists in the Cisco PIX 500 Series
Security Appliance (PIX) and the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security
Appliance (ASA) that may result in a reload of the device. This
vulnerability is triggered during processing of a crafted IP packet when
the Time-to-Live (TTL) decrement feature is enabled. This vulnerability
is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsk48199.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.
* Cisco PIX and ASA TTL Vulnerability (CSCsk48199)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory
will result in a reload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation
can result in a sustained denial of service (DoS) condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
This vulnerability is fixed in software version 7.2(3)6 or 8.0(3) and
later.
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
===========
Disable the TTL decrement feature using the no set connection
decrement-ttl command in class configuration mode.
ASA(config)#policy-map localpolicy1
ASA(config-pmap)#class local_server
ASA(config-pmap-c)#no set connection decrement-ttl
ASA(config-pmap-c)#exit
For additional information on identifying and mitigating TTL based
attacks, please refer to the Cisco Applied Intelligence White Paper
"TTL Expiry Attack Identification and Mitigation", available at:
http://cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/ttl-expiry.html
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise
using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms
of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of this Notice: Final
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-asa.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2008-January-23 | public |
| | | release |
+----------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
All contents are Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Jan 21, 2008 Document ID: 100314
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
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--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
Cisco PIX and ASA security appliances which do not support the TTL decrement
feature or are not explicitly configured for it are not vulnerable.
Note: The TTL decrement feature was introduced in version 7.2(2), and it is
disabled by default. The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is not
vulnerable.
Eric Davis
Sr. Network Technician
Rockefeller University IT Dept.
212-327-7508
646-772-4667(cell)
-----Original Message-----
From: nobody@cisco.com [mailto:nobody@cisco.com] On Behalf Of Cisco Systems
Product Security Incident Response Team
Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 11:34 AM
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Cc: psirt@cisco.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco PIX and ASA Time-to-Live
Vulnerability
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco PIX and ASA Time-to-Live Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080123-asa
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-asa.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 January 23 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
A crafted IP packet vulnerability exists in the Cisco PIX 500 Series
Security Appliance (PIX) and the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security
Appliance (ASA) that may result in a reload of the device. This
vulnerability is triggered during processing of a crafted IP packet when
the Time-to-Live (TTL) decrement feature is enabled.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-0028 has
been assigned to this vulnerability.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. A workaround that mitigates this vulnerability is
available.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-asa.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The TTL decrement feature was introduced in version 7.2(2) and it is
disabled by default. The Cisco PIX and ASA security appliances running
software versions prior to 7.2(3)006 or 8.0(3) and that have the TTL
decrement feature enabled are vulnerable.
By default the PIX and ASA security appliance software does not
decrement the TTL of transient packets. The ability to decrement the TTL
of transient packets can be enabled on a selective or global basis by
using the set connection decrement-ttl command in the policy-map class
configuration mode. To determine whether you are running this feature
use the show running-config command and search for the set connection
decrement-ttl command. Alternatively you can use the include argument to
search for this command as follows:
ASA#show running-config | include decrement-ttl
set connection decrement-ttl
ASA#
The set connection decrement-ttl command is part of a configured
class-map. In order for this command to take effect it must be applied
using a policy-map (assigned globally or to an interface). For more
information about the Modular Policy Framework on the Cisco ASA and PIX
refer to the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa80/configuration/guide/mpc.h
tml
To determine whether you are running a vulnerable version of Cisco PIX
or ASA software, issue the show version command-line interface (CLI)
command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA Security Appliance that
runs software release 7.2(3):
ASA#show version
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 7.2(3)
[...]
Customers who use the Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) to
manage their devices can find the version of the software displayed in
the table in the login window or in the upper left corner of the ASDM
window. The version notation is similar to the following:
PIX Version 7.2(3)
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
Cisco PIX and ASA security appliances which do not support the TTL
decrement feature or are not explicitly configured for it are not
vulnerable.
Note: The TTL decrement feature was introduced in version 7.2(2), and it
is disabled by default. The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is not
vulnerable.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
A crafted IP packet vulnerability exists in the Cisco PIX 500 Series
Security Appliance (PIX) and the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security
Appliance (ASA) that may result in a reload of the device. This
vulnerability is triggered during processing of a crafted IP packet when
the Time-to-Live (TTL) decrement feature is enabled. This vulnerability
is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsk48199.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.
* Cisco PIX and ASA TTL Vulnerability (CSCsk48199)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory
will result in a reload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation
can result in a sustained denial of service (DoS) condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
This vulnerability is fixed in software version 7.2(3)6 or 8.0(3) and
later.
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
===========
Disable the TTL decrement feature using the no set connection
decrement-ttl command in class configuration mode.
ASA(config)#policy-map localpolicy1
ASA(config-pmap)#class local_server
ASA(config-pmap-c)#no set connection decrement-ttl
ASA(config-pmap-c)#exit
For additional information on identifying and mitigating TTL based
attacks, please refer to the Cisco Applied Intelligence White Paper
"TTL Expiry Attack Identification and Mitigation", available at:
http://cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/ttl-expiry.html
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address this
vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise
using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms
of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.htm
l,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of this Notice: Final
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-asa.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2008-January-23 | public |
| | | release |
+----------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.h
tml.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
All contents are Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Jan 21, 2008 Document ID: 100314
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
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--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Default Passwords in the Application Velocity
System
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080123-avs
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-avs.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 January 23 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Versions of the Cisco Application Velocity System (AVS) prior to
software version AVS 5.1.0 do not prompt users to modify system account
passwords during the initial configuration process. Because there is no
requirement to change these credentials during the initial configuration
process, an attacker may be able to leverage the accounts that have
default credentials, some of which have root privileges, to take full
administrative control of the AVS system.
After upgrading to software version AVS 5.1.0, users will be prompted to
modify these credentials.
Cisco will make free upgrade software available to address this
vulnerability for affected customers. The software upgrade will
be applicable only for the AVS 3120, 3180, and 3180A systems. The
workaround identified in this document describes how to change the
passwords in current releases of software for the AVS 3110.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-0029 has
been assigned to this vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-avs.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
This vulnerability affects the Cisco AVS 3110, 3120, 3180, and 3180A
Management Station appliances that are running software versions prior
to AVS 5.1.0. Administrators can determine the software version of the
AVS appliances by logging in to the Management Station web-based user
interface or from the command-line interface (CLI) of the appliance
operating system.
Customers who use the AVS 3180 or 3180A Management Station can determine
their node software versions by navigating to the Cluster Information
Page. Each registered node will display the corresponding software
version when the node is selected.
The AVS appliance version can also be determined from the host operating
system by using the "Show Version" command.
The following example shows "Show Version" output for an AVS 3120
appliance that is running version 5.1.0:
velocity>Show Version
****************************************
Cisco Application Velocity System,(AVS)
----------------------------------------
AVS 3120-K9 005.001(000.034)
****************************************
The following example shows "Show Version" output for an AVS 3180 or
3180A appliance that is running version 5.1.0:
velocity>Show Version
****************************************
Cisco Application Velocity System,(AVS)
----------------------------------------
AVS 3180-MGMT 005.001(000.034)
****************************************
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
The Cisco AVS 3110 and 3120 are enterprise data center appliances for
improving web application performance, measuring end-user response
time, and managing application security. The Cisco AVS 3120 enforces
application security with an integrated web application firewall. The
Cisco AVS 3180 and 3180A Management Stations provide web-based tools for
the configuration and application performance monitoring for a cluster
of AVS 3110s and 3120s or individual nodes.
The Cisco AVS 3110, 3120, 3180, and 3180A Management Stations use some
system accounts that are initially configured with default passwords.
Vulnerable versions of the AVS software do not prompt the administrator
to change the passwords for these accounts, including accounts with root
privileges, during the initial configuration process. Non-vulnerable
versions of AVS software will now prompt administrators to change these
accounts after installation.
Note: If the passwords for the AVS 3110 or 3120 are changed on the
device itself and it has previously been registered with an AVS 3180
or 3180A Management Station, the node must be re-registered with the
Management Station console. Otherwise, communication between the AVS
3180 or 3180A Management Station and AVS 3110 or 3120 node will be lost.
For additional details about the AVS node registration process, refer to
the "Register Node" section of the Cisco AVS User's Guide.
After upgrading the appliance software to version AVS 5.1.0 and logging
in for the first time, the administrator will now be prompted to change
the system account passwords.
The following example shows the new password change prompts and the
subsequent password change dialog for the AVS 3120 after upgrade:
velocity login: fgn
Password:
**WARNING** System wide secrets are in factory default state.
Would you like to change these now? [y/n] y changing root password
enter password:
enter password again:
changing fgn password
enter password:
enter password again:
changing DB password
enter password:
enter password again:
Please wait...The DB password change will take a few minutes.
changing node manager password
enter password:
enter password again:
changing condenser password
enter password:
enter password again:
changing console password
enter password:
enter password again:
The following example shows the new password change prompts and the
subsequent password change dialog for the AVS 3180 and 3180A after
upgrade:
velocity login: fgn
Password:
**WARNING** System wide secrets are in factory default state.
Would you like to change these now? [y/n] y changing root password
enter password:
enter password again:
changing fgn password
enter password:
enter password again:
changing DB password
enter password:
enter password again:
Please wait...The DB password change will take a few minutes.
changing console password
enter password:
enter password again:
This issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsd94732.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.
* AVS Default Account Passwords Don't Require Change (CSCsd94732)
CVSS Base Score - 10.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in full
administrative control of the Cisco AVS system or user-level access to
the host operating system.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
AVS software version 5.1.0 contains the fix for the vulnerability
described in this document.
AVS software is available for download from the following locations on
cisco.com:
* AVS 3120 5.1.0 (http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/AVS3120-5.1)
* AVS 3180 5.1.0 (http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/AVS3180-5.1)
Workarounds
===========
The following workarounds are applicable only for the AVS 3110 and are
performed on the system shell. The AVS 3110 does not have a CLI. The use
of strong passwords is encouraged.
Changing the Root Password
+-------------------------
Complete these steps:
1. Change the root password by using the following command:
shell# passwd
2. Reboot to activate the new settings by using the following command:
shell# reboot
Changing the Management Console Username and Password
+----------------------------------------------------
Complete these steps:
1. Open the following file in a text editor:
$AVS_HOME/console/jboss-3.0.1_tomcat-4.0.4/server/default/deploy/
fgconsole.war/users.properties
Use the line admin=admin to set the username and password. The
username appears before the equal sign (=) and the password appears
after the equal sign (=). For example, to change the username to
Cisco and the password to accelerate, change the admin=admin line
to Cisco=accelerate.
2. If you change the username, you must also change this file:
$AVS_HOME/console/jboss-3.0.1_tomcat-4.0.4/server/default/deploy/
fgconsole.war/roles.properties
The username is set by the line that contains admin=. The username
appears before the equal sign (=). For example, to change the user
name to Cisco, change the admin= line to Cisco=. Do not change the
text after the equal sign (=) in this file; this field specifies
the account privileges. The username that you enter here must match
the one in the users.properties file in the preceding step.
Changing the Database Username and Password
+------------------------------------------
There are two steps required to change the database password:
1. First change the database password.
2. Then update the Management Console configuration file with the new
database password.
Complete these steps:
1. Log in to the database using the old password, and then use the
alter SQL command to change to the new password.
/usr/local/fineground/console/postgres/bin/psql
-U fineground -p 5432 fgnlog Password : <old password>
Welcome to psql 7.3.4, the PostgreSQL interactive terminal.
Type: \copyright for distribution terms
\h for help with SQL commands
\? for help on internal slash commands
\g or terminate with semicolon to execute query
\q to quit
fgnlog=# alter user fineground password '<new password>'; \q
2. The username and password to access the Management Console database
are set during the Management Console installation process. If you
want to change these later, you can modify an XML configuration
file that the Management Console server reads at start-up.
a. Open the following file in a text editor:
$AVS_HOME/console/jboss-3.0.1_tomcat-4.0.4/server/default/
deploy/postgres-service.xml
Look for the following section in this file:
<!--set these only if you want only default logins,
not through JAAS -->
<config-property name="UserName" type="java.lang.String">fineground</config-property>
<config-property name="Password" type="java.lang.String">condenser</config-property>
b. To change the username, change the value for the UserName
configuration property (fineground in this example).
c. To change the password, change the value for the Password
configuration property (condenser in this example).
d. Save and close the file.
Changing the Node Manager Password
+---------------------------------
Complete these steps:
1. Log in as fgn, and then use the su command to switch to the
superuser.
2. Stop the Condenser and Node Manager:
/etc/init.d/fgnpn<Tab> stop
Press Tab to have the interface complete the command.
3. Go to the $AVS_HOME/perfnode/node_manager/conf directory.
4. Back up the file named passwords.
5. Change the password with the following command:
$AVS_HOME/perfnode/bin/htpasswd -bcm passwords.new admin <password>
In the preceding command, passwords.new is the name of the file in
which the passwords are stored. Currently only the user admin is
supported.
6. Install the file with the following command:
install -m 400 -o nobody -g nobody passwords.new passwords
7. Restart the appliance with the reboot command.
8. Re-register the node from the Management Console for which the node
manager password was changed.
Changing the Condenser Password
+------------------------------
Complete these steps:
1. Log in as fgn, and then use the su command to switch to the
superuser.
2. Stop the Condenser and Node Manager:
/etc/init.d/fgnpn<TAB> stop
Press Tab to have the interface complete the command.
3. Go to the $AVS_HOME/perfnode/passwd directory.
4. Backup the file named .htpasswd.
5. Change the password with the following command:
$AVS_HOME/perfnode/bin/htpasswd -bcm passwords.new fineground <password>
In the preceding command, passwords.new is the name of the file in
which the passwords are stored. Currently only the user fineground
is supported.
6. Install the file with the following command:
install -m 400 -o nobody -g nobody passwords.new .htpasswd
7. Restart the appliance with the reboot command.
8. Re-register the node from the Management Console for which the
Condenser password was changed.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability.
Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance
provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known
issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was identified through internal testing.
Status of this Notice: Final
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080123-avs.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2008-January-23 | Initial public release |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
All contents are Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Jan 21, 2008 Document ID: 100212
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
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