[guru] Cisco biztonsagi frissitesek
DATE: Fri, 14 Jul 2006 21:30:10 +0200
Tübb hibát találtak a Wireless Control System access point és wireless
hálózati menedzselő eszközben.
A hibák kihasználásával
o kényes konfigurációs lehet hozzájutni információkhoz az ap
menedzsmentről
o tetszőleges file írható, olvasható a WCS rendszeren
o be lehet lépni a WCS rendszerre default adminisztrátor jelszóval
o script futtatható a WCS felhasználó browserében
o könyvtárak érhetők el, melyek kényes konfigurációs információkat
tartalmaznak.
Biztonsági hibát találtak az Cisco Access Point Web-Browser Interface-ben.
Bizonyos körülmények között adminisztratív hozzáférés lehetséges a
felhasználói credential érvényességének ellenőrzése nélkül.
Több biztonsági hibát találtak a Cisco Unified CallManager-ben (a Cisco IP
telefon megoldásásnak sw alapú híváskezelő része).
Privilégium kikerülési lehetőséget találtak a Command Line Interface-ben
(CLI), melynek kihasználásával egy authentikált adminisztrátor root-ként
hozzáférhet az alap operációsrendszerhez.
Buffer overflow hibát találtak a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) kérést
tatralmazó hostname feldolgozásban, melynek kihasználásával tetszőleges kód
futtatható, vagy DoS okozható.
A hibák csak a Cisco Unified CallManager 5.0 verziót érintik.
A Cisco Router Web Setup nem biztonságos default IOS beállításokkal
rendelkezik, melynek kihasználásával tetszőleges kód futtatható 15-ös
szintü privilégiummal, ami a legmagasabb a Cisco IOS eszközökön.
DoS sebezhetőséget fedeztek fel a Cisco Intrusion Prevention System-ben.
A deformált csomagokkal elért DoS következményeként egy IPS device
elérhetetlenné válhat távolról vagy console-ról, és képtelen csomagokat
közvetíteni. Ezek után a hibán csak a power reset segít.
A frissítések elérhetők.
--- Begin Message ---
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Wireless Control
System
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060628-wcs
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-wcs.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2006 June 28 1600 UTC (GMT)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
========
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Customers with Service Contracts
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
Customers without Service Contracts
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Wireless Control System (WCS) contains multiple vulnerabilities
which may allow a remote user to:
* access sensitive configuration information about access points
managed by WCS
* read from and write to arbitrary files on a WCS system
* log in to a WCS system with a default administrator password
* execute script code in a WCS user's web browser
* access directories which may reveal sensitive WCS configuration
information
There are workarounds for several, but not all, of these
vulnerabilities. See the Workarounds section for more information.
Cisco has made free software available to address these
vulnerabilities for affected customers.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-wcs.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
+---------------------------------------+
| DDTS | Affected Releases |
|------------+--------------------------|
| | WCS for Linux and |
| CSCsd15955 | Windows 3.2(40) and |
| | earlier |
|------------+--------------------------|
| | WCS for Linux and |
| CSCsd15951 | Windows 3.2(51) and |
| | earlier |
|------------+--------------------------|
| | WCS for Linux and |
| CSCse21391 | Windows 4.0(1) and |
| | earlier |
|------------+--------------------------|
| | WCS for Linux and |
| CSCsd71397 | Windows 3.2(51) and |
| | earlier |
|------------+--------------------------|
| | WCS for Linux and |
| CSCse01127 | Windows 3.2(51) and |
| | earlier |
|------------+--------------------------|
| | WCS for Linux and |
| CSCse01409 | Windows 3.2(51) and |
| | earlier |
+---------------------------------------+
The version of WCS software installed on a particular device can be
found via the WCS HTTP management interface. Select Help -> About the
Software to obtain the software version.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
Wireless Control System is a centralized, systems-level application
for managing and controlling lightweight access points and wireless
LAN controllers for the Cisco Unified Wireless Network.
WCS contains multiple vulnerabilities including information
disclosure and privilege escalation issues. The issues are detailed
below:
* CSCsd15955-Remote users can connect to the WCS internal database
with an undocumented username and hard-coded password, gaining
access to the sensitive configuration information of managed
wireless access points.
* CSCsd15951-The undocumented database username and password are
present in several WCS files in clear text.
* CSCse21391-WCS installations contain the default administrator
username root with a default password of public. The password is
not required to be changed during installation or upon the
initial login. There is a workaround for this vulnerability.
* CSCsd71397-A remote user can read from or write to arbitrary
locations in the filesystem of a WCS system via the internal TFTP
server. This problem only occurs if the directory path chosen by
the user during the installation of WCS for the root of the
internal TFTP server contains a space character. There is a
workaround for this vulnerability.
* CSCse01127-The login page for the WCS HTTP interface fails to
properly sanitize user-supplied data for malicious script code.
This may result in the ability for an attacker to entice a user
to access a malicious URL which executes arbitrary script code in
the user's web browser.
* CSCse01409-The WCS HTTP server does not properly secure certain
directories, potentially allowing access to sensitive information
like WCS usernames and directory paths.
These issues are documented by the following Cisco bug IDs:
* CSCsd15955 ( registered customers only) -WCS DBserver is remotely
accessible using Solid SQL and static password
* CSCsd15951 ( registered customers only) -Database passwords are
written in clear text on the program folders
* CSCse21391 ( registered customers only) -WCS ships with default
administrator account and password
* CSCsd71397 ( registered customers only) -WCS tftp read/writes to
C:\ if given dir has a space
* CSCse01127 ( registered customers only) -Possible CSS attack on
login page of WCS
* CSCse01409 ( registered customers only) -WCS allows
unauthenticated access to user list and html files on server
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities presented in this
advisory have different impacts.
* CSCsd15955-May result in the exposure of sensitive configuration
information for wireless access points managed by the WCS server,
including encryption keys. With the encryption keys for managed
wireless networks, an attacker can intercept and decrypt network
traffic.
* CSCsd15951-May allow an attacker to gain access to the WCS
internal database.
* CSCse21391-May allow an attacker to gain complete control of a
WCS installation.
* CSCsd71397-May result in the ability to read from and write to
arbitrary locations in the filesystem of a system running WCS,
including the ability to overwrite and create new files.
* CSCse01127-Exploitation may allow an attacker to execute
arbitrary script code in a user's web browser. This may be used
to obtain sensitive session information which can be used to
access the WCS management interface.
* CSCse01409-Exploitation may allow an attacker to obtain sensitive
WCS configuration data such as WCS usernames and directory
installation paths.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
WCS version 4.0 can be obtained from
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/Wireless_Control_System_Software.
Please contact the Cisco TAC to obtain earlier versions of WCS
software.
+---------------------------------------+
| DDTS | Affected | Fixed |
| | Releases | Releases |
|------------+-----------+--------------|
| | WCS for | WCS for |
| | Linux and | Linux and |
| CSCsd15955 | Windows | Windows 3.2 |
| | 3.2(40) | (51) and |
| | and | later |
| | earlier | |
|------------+-----------+--------------|
| | WCS for | WCS for |
| | Linux and | Linux and |
| CSCsd15951 | Windows | Windows 3.2 |
| | 3.2(51) | (63) and |
| | and | later |
| | earlier | |
|------------+-----------+--------------|
| | | Vulnerable, |
| | WCS for | fix |
| | Linux and | available |
| | Windows | fourth |
| CSCse21391 | 4.0(1) | quarter of |
| | and | 2006. |
| | earlier | |
| | | See |
| | | Workarounds. |
|------------+-----------+--------------|
| | WCS for | WCS for |
| | Linux and | Linux and |
| CSCsd71397 | Windows | Windows 3.2 |
| | 3.2(51) | (63) and |
| | and | later |
| | earlier | |
|------------+-----------+--------------|
| | WCS for | WCS for |
| | Linux and | Linux and |
| CSCse01127 | Windows | Windows 3.2 |
| | 3.2(51) | (63) and |
| | and | later |
| | earlier | |
|------------+-----------+--------------|
| | WCS for | WCS for |
| | Linux and | Linux and |
| CSCse01409 | Windows | Windows 3.2 |
| | 3.2(51) | (63) and |
| | and | later |
| | earlier | |
+---------------------------------------+
Users of the 3.2 software version can upgrade to 3.2(63) to receive
all fixes. CSCse21391 currently has no fix, although there is a
workaround that will completely eliminate the vulnerability. Fixed
software will be available in the fourth quarter of 2006.
Workarounds
===========
There are are no workarounds for vulnerabilities described in
CSCsd15955 (default database account and password), CSCsd15951
(database user and password in clear text), CSCse01127 (XSS) and
CSCse01409 (unprotected HTTP directories).
There is a workaround for the vulnerability described in CSCse21391
(default administrator account and password). Users can change the
password for the root username via the WCS HTTP management interface.
Select Administration -> Accounts -> root to change the password.
There is a workaround for the vulnerability described in CSCsd71397
(TFTP file read and write). Follow these steps to mitigate the TFTP
vulnerability.
* Stop the WCS service via Programs -> Wireless Control System ->
StopWCS.
* Edit the file \webnms\conf\NmsProcessesBE.conf. WCS is typically
installed in C:\Program Files\WCS32. Modify the section
# java com.adventnet.nms.tftp.NmsTftpServer [TFTP_ROOT_DIRECTORY dir] [PORT portNo]
# RJS WARNING - If you change these lines, you must change the installer.
PROCESS com.adventnet.nms.tftp.NmsTftpServer
ARGS TFTP_ROOT_DIRECTORY C:/some directory PORT 69 RETRIES 3 TIMEOUT 30000
by placing quotes around the directory path like "C:/some
directory".
* Start the WCS service via Programs -> Wireless Control System ->
StartWCS.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed
software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers
should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for
feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their
environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by
the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-wcs.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2006-June-28 | Public |
| | | Release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Cisco Security Advisory: Access Point Web-Browser Interface
Vulnerability
=====================================================================
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20062806-ap.shtml
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-ap.shtml
Revision 1.0
============
Contact PSIRT at psirt@cisco.com if you have any questions regarding
the receipt or use of this information.
For Public Release 2006 June 28 1700 UTC (GMT)
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
========
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Version and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Customers with Service Contracts
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
Customers without Service Contracts
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice: DRAFT
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
The Cisco web-browser interface for Cisco access points contains a
vulnerability that could, under certain circumstances, remove the
default security configuration from the managed access point and
allow administrative access without validation of administrative user
credentials.
Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers.
There are workarounds available to mitigate the effects of this
vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-ap.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following access points are affected if running Cisco IOS version
12.3(8)JA or 12.3(8)JA1 and are configured for web-interface
management:
* 350 Wireless Access Point and Wireless Bridge
* 1100 Wireless Access Point
* 1130 Wireless Access Point
* 1200 Wireless Access Point
* 1240 Wireless Access Point
* 1310 Wireless Bridge
* 1410 Wireless Access Point
To determine if web-interface management is enabled on a Cisco access
point, log into the device and issue the "show ip http server status"
command. If the output shows either 'http server status' or 'http
secure server status' as "enabled", web-interface management is
enabled.
An example is shown below with web-interface management enabled:
ap#show ip http server status
HTTP server status: Enabled
HTTP server port: 80
[...lines removed...]
HTTP secure server status: Disabled
HTTP secure server port: 443
[...lines removed...]
Web-interface management (HTTP server) is enabled by default.
To check the version of Cisco IOS running on the access point:
Via Browser:
Click on 'System Software menu'. The Cisco IOS version will be
displayed in the field "System Software Version".
Via Command Line Interface (CLI):
To determine the software running on a Cisco access point, log
into the device and issue the "show version" command to display the
system banner.
Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating
System Software" or simply "IOS".
On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between
parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS release name.
Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will
give different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco acess point running Cisco
IOS release 12.3(7)JA1 with an installed image name of C1200-K9W7-M:
ap#show version
Cisco IOS Software, C1200 Software (C1200-K9W7-M),
Version 12.3(7)JA1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright (c) 1986-2005 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Thu 06-Oct-05 09:40 by evmiller
!
[...lines removed...]
!
Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found
at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
* Access Points that are not running Cisco IOS.
* Access Points that are running any version of Cisco IOS other
than 12.3(8)JA or 12.3(8)JA1.
* Access Points with disabled web-interface management (Both HTTP
and HTTP secure) are not vulnerable.
* All Cisco access points running in lightweight mode.
Details
=======
The web-browser interface contains management pages that are used to
change the wireless device settings, upgrade firmware, and monitor
and configure other wireless devices on the network.
The web-browser interface is enabled by default, and is indicated by
the configuration command "ip http server" or
"ip http secure-server".
An access point running a default configuration will use the default
enable secret password for administrative access. This can be
modified via the web-browser interface tab 'Security --> Admin Access
- --> Default Authentication (Global Password)' or via the CLI with the
configuration command "enable secret [new_secret]".
"Local User List Only (Individual Passswords)" allows administrators
of the access points to define a local unique username/password
database for their administrators, so that a common global password
is not shared.
A vulnerability exists in the access point web-browser interface when
'Security --> Admin Access' is changed from: "Default Authentication
(Global Password)" to "Local User List Only (Individual Passwords)".
This results in the Access Point being re-configured with no
security, either Global Password or Individual Passwords, enabled.
This allows for open access to the Access Point via the web browser
interface or via the console port with no validation of user
credentials.
Access points configured for "Local User List Only (Individual
Passwords)" and running non-vulnerable versions of Cisco IOS which
are subsequently upgraded to a vulnerable version of IOS are not
affected by this vulnerability as long as the configuration is not
altered after the upgrade.
This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID:
CSCsd67403 -- Cannot Select Option to Authenticate using Local User
List Only.
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will result in
unauthorized administrative access to the access point via the
web management interface or via the console port.
Software Version and Fixes
==========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release
train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a
given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible
releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the
anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild"
and "Maintenance" columns.
A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than
the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release)
is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least
to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal
to the First Fixed Release label).
For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance,"
consult the following URL:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Major Release | Availability of Repaired Releases |
|---------------+---------------------------------------------------|
| 12.3 | Rebuild | Maintenance |
|---------------+------------+--------------------------------------|
| 12.3(8)JA | 12.3(8)JA2 | 12.3(11)JA; available 29th June 2006 |
|---------------+------------+--------------------------------------|
| 12.3(8)JA1 | 12.3(8)JA2 | 12.3(11)JA; available 29th June 2006 |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Workarounds
===========
Either of the following workarounds and mitigations may be used to
help mitigate the effects of this vulnerability:
* Disable Web-Based Management:
To prevent use of the web-browser interface via:
Web-Based Management:
select the "Disable Web-Based Management" check box on the
'Services --> HTTP-Web Server' page and click "Apply".
CLI:
Log into the device and issue the configuration commands
(ensure to save the configuration upon exiting):
ap(config)#no ip http server
ap(config)#no ip http secure-server
ap(config)#exit
* Configure via CLI:
Enabling "Local User List Only (Individual Passwords)" via the
CLI rather than the web-browser interface will provide the
access point with the desired protected configuration. Log into
the device and issue the configuration commands (ensure to save
the configuration upon exiting):
ap#configure terminal
ap(config)#!setup the username password pair first
ap(config)#username test privilege 15 password test
ap(config)#!enable AAA
ap(config)#aaa new-model
ap(config)#!enable aaa authentication to local database
ap(config)#aaa authentication login default local
ap(config)#!enable aaa authorization to local database
ap(config)#aaa authorization exec default local
ap(config)#!Enable http authentication to AAA.
ap(config)#ip http authentication aaa
ap(config)#exit
* Configure Radius/Tacacs Server first:
Via the web-browser interface enabling any radius/tacacs+ server
within 'Security --> Server Manager --> Corporate Servers' and
then performing the option of 'Security --> Admin Access' as
"Local User List Only (Individual Passwords)" will provide a
work around to this vulnerability.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed
software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers
should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for
feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their
environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as
otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
======================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-ap.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2006-June-28 | Initial public release |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/
products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices.
All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Cisco Unified CallManager
Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060712-cucm
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-cucm.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2006 July 12 1600 UTC (GMT)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
========
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Version and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Unified CallManager (CUCM) 5.0 has Command Line Interface (CLI)
and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) related vulnerabilities. There
are potential privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the CLI which
may allow an authenticated administrator to access the base operating
system with root privileges. There is also a buffer overflow
vulnerability in the processing of hostnames contained in a SIP
request which may result in arbitrary code execution or cause a
denial of service. These vulnerabilities only affect Cisco Unified
CallManager 5.0.
Cisco has made free software available to address these
vulnerabilities for affected customers. There are no workarounds
available to mitigate the effects of these vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-cucm.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Only Cisco Unified CallManager versions 5.0(1), 5.0(2), 5.0(3) and
5.0(3a) are affected.
The version of CallManager software running can be determined
navigating to Show > Software in the CUCM IPT Platform administration
interface or by running the command show version active in the CLI.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities, including all previous versions of Cisco Unified
CallManager.
Details
=======
Cisco Unified CallManager is the software-based call-processing
component of the Cisco IP telephony solution which extends enterprise
telephony features and functions to packet telephony network devices
such as IP phones, media processing devices, voice-over-IP (VoIP)
gateways, and multimedia applications.
The CallManager CLI provides a backup management interface to the
system in order to diagnose and troubleshoot the primary HTTPS-based
management interfaces. The CLI, which runs as the root user, contains
two vulnerabilities in the parsing of commands. The first
vulnerability may allow an authenticated CUCM administrator to
execute arbitrary operating system programs as the root user. The
second vulnerability may allow output redirection of a command to a
file or a folder specified on the command line.
Cisco Unified CallManager supports the coexistence of both SCCP and
SIP phones, allowing for migration to SIP while protecting
investments in existing devices. CUCM contains a buffer overflow
vulnerability in the processing of excessively long hostnames which
may be included in a SIP request.
These issues are documented by the following Cisco bug IDs:
* CSCse11005 ( registered customers only) Certain CLI commands
allow execution of arbitrary Linux commands
* CSCse31704 ( registered customers only) User able to redirect
command output to a file folder
* CSCsd96542 ( registered customers only) SD-GA: CCM cores when SIP
request line host name has ASCII overflow
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the CLI vulnerability documented in Cisco
bug ID CSCse11005 may allow authenticated CLI users to execute
arbitrary operating system commands with root privileges.
Exploitation of the CLI vulnerability documented in Cisco bug ID
CSCse31704 may allow an authenticated CLI user to modify or overwrite
any file on the filesystem as the root user.
Exploitation of the SIP vulnerability documented in Cisco bug ID
CSCsd96542 may result in arbitrary code execution or a denial of
service.
Software Version and Fixes
==========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for these vulnerabilities.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed
software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers
should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for
feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their
environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by
the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as
otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades.
Fixed software may obtained at
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/callmgr-50
+---------------------------------------+
| Affected Releases | Fixed Releases |
|---------------------+-----------------|
| Cisco Unified | |
| CallManager 5.0(1) | |
| | |
| Cisco Unified | Cisco Unified |
| CallManager 5.0(2) | CallManager |
| | |
| Cisco Unified | 5.0(4) and |
| CallManager 5.0(3) | later |
| | |
| Cisco Unified | |
| CallManager 5.0(3a) | |
+---------------------------------------+
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com .
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-cucm.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | 2006-July-12 | Initial |
| 1.0 | 1600 UTC | public |
| | (GMT) | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Cisco Security Advisory:
Cisco Router Web Setup Ships with Insecure Default IOS Configuration
Document ID: 70650
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060712-crws
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-crws.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2006 July 12 1600 UTC (GMT)
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
========
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Version and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
The default Cisco IOS configuration shipped with the Cisco Router Web
Setup (CRWS) application allows the execution of commands at privilege
level 15 through the Cisco IOS HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol)
server web interface without requiring authentication credentials.
Privilege level 15 is the highest privilege level on Cisco IOS?
devices.
Fixed versions of the CRWS application have been modified by Cisco to
provide a more secure default IOS configuration and additional
functionality with regards to the Cisco IOS HTTP server web interface.
This issue does not require a Cisco IOS software upgrade or a CRWS
software upgrade. Customers who decide to upgrade to a fixed version of
CRWS and deploy the new default IOS configuration will not need to
deploy the suggested workarounds. Customers who elect NOT to upgrade to
a fixed CRWS version, or customers upgrading to a fixed CRWS version
who keep their existing configuration should implement the workarounds
identified in this advisory.
Additional information on the new default IOS configuration shipped
with the CRWS application is available in the Details section of this
advisory.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-crws.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following Cisco routers whose configurations have been based on the
default IOS configuration shipped with any version of CRWS prior to
version 3.3.0 build 31 may be affected by this vulnerability:
* Cisco 806
* Cisco 826
* Cisco 827
* Cisco 827H
* Cisco 827-4v
* Cisco 828
* Cisco 831
* Cisco 836
* Cisco 837
* Cisco SOHO 71
* Cisco SOHO 76
* Cisco SOHO 77
* Cisco SOHO 77H
* Cisco SOHO 78
* Cisco SOHO 91
* Cisco SOHO 96
* Cisco SOHO 97
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
Any of the previously listed Cisco routers whose IOS configuration is
not based on the default IOS configuration shipped with the CRWS
application are not vulnerable.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
The Cisco Router Web Setup tool (CRWS) provides a graphical user
interface (GUI) for configuring Cisco SOHO and Cisco 800 series
routers, and allows users to set up their routers quickly and easily.
The GUI is accessed through the Cisco IOS HTTP server, which is enabled
on the default IOS configuration shipped with the CRWS application.
The Cisco IOS HTTP server uses the "enable password" (assuming one has
been configured) as its default authentication mechanism. Other
authentication mechanisms can be configured, including the use of a
local user database, an external RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In
User Service) or an external TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access
Control System) server. The default IOS configuration shipped with the
CRWS application does not include an "enable password" or an "enable
secret" command, allowing access to the Cisco IOS HTTP server interface
at any privilege level, up to and including privilege level 15, without
providing authentication credentials. Privilege level 15 is the highest
privilege level on Cisco IOS devices.
To resolve this vulnerability, Cisco has made changes to the default
IOS configuration shipped with the CRWS application and to the CRWS
application itself. Those changes are as follows:
* The addition of a default username and password combination to be
used during initial device configuration.
Note: CRWS will prompt the user to change those default
credentials during its first invocation. It is strongly recommended
for customers to remove those default credentials from the device
configuration by using the Cisco IOS CLI (command line interface)
if not planning to use the CRWS application for device
configuration.
* The addition of an authentication mechanism for the Cisco IOS HTTP
server to authenticate users based on the local user database.
* The addition of an access restriction to only allow connections to
the Cisco IOS HTTP server from the internal network, using the
addressing schema from the default IOS configuration shipped with
CRWS.
* The addition of a login banner, displayed on connections to the
device through Telnet or the console port, reminding users to
remove the default credentials.
* The addition of an authentication mechanism to the console port to
authenticate users based on the local user database.
* A modification to the CRWS application to force users to change the
default credentials the first time they access the CRWS GUI.
* A modification to the CRWS application to allow users to enable or
disable access to the IOS HTTP server interface from the public
interface.
This vulnerability is documented by the following Cisco bug ID:
* CSCsa78190
Note: Implementation of the available workarounds require manual
configuration to mitigate the impact of this vulnerability for existing
CRWS customers, even if upgrading to a fixed version of software.
Devices using CRWS for configuration and management are affected by
this vulnerability if the following conditions are met:
* The current device configuration is based on the default IOS
configuration shipped with the CRWS application, and
* the Cisco IOS HTTP server, which is enabled in the default IOS
configuration shipped with CRWS, has not been disabled by the user,
and
* no additional authentication mechanism (for example, local user
database, RADIUS, TACACS+) has been defined for access to the IOS
HTTP server, or no "enable password" or "enable secret" is present in
the configuration.
The following procedure can be used to determine if a given device is
vulnerable:
1. Is the Cisco IOS HTTP server enabled on the device?
* YES - Proceed to step 2.
* NO - The device is not vulnerable.
2. Is there an authentication mechanism configured for access to the
IOS HTTP server interface?
* YES - The device is not vulnerable.
* NO - Proceed to step 3.
3. Is there an "enable password" or an "enable secret" configured on the
device?
* YES - The device is not vulnerable.
* NO - The device is vulnerable. Please read the Software Versions and
Fixes section and the Workarounds sections of this security
advisory.
The following step-by-step procedure can be used in order to obtain the
information needed to answer the questions in the previous procedure:
1. In order to determine if the Cisco IOS HTTP server is enabled on
the device, execute the following command from a privileged CLI
prompt:
show running-config | include ip http
The following example shows a device on which the Cisco IOS HTTP
server is enabled:
Router#show running-config | include ip http
ip http server
Router#
The following example shows a device on which the Cisco IOS HTTP
server is disabled:
Router#show running-config | include ip http
no ip http server
Router#
Note: Newer versions of the Cisco IOS HTTP server provide SSL
(Secure Sockets Layer) encryption. This vulnerability can also be
exploited if the SSL-enabled Cisco IOS HTTP server is enabled on
the configuration. The following example shows a device on which
the standard Cisco IOS HTTP server is disabled, but the SSL-enabled
Cisco IOS HTTP server is enabled:
Router#show running-config | include ip http
no ip http server
ip http secure-server
Router#
2. In order to determine if an authentication mechanism has been
applied to the Cisco IOS HTTP server, execute the following command
from a privileged CLI prompt:
show running-config | include ip http
The following example shows a device on which the Cisco IOS HTTP
server is enabled and the local authentication mechanism has been
configured:
Router#show running-config | include ip http
ip http server
ip http authentication local
no ip http secure-server
Router#
The absence of an "ip http authentication" line on the device
configuration implies that the Cisco IOS HTTP server will use the
"enable secret" or "enable password" (if so configured) as the
authentication mechanism. Additional information on AAA mechanisms
available for the Cisco IOS HTTP server can be found in the
document entitled "AAA Control of the IOS HTTP Server", available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk59/technologies_tech_note09186a008069bdc5.shtml .
3. In order to determine if an "enable password" or "enable secret" has
been configured, execute the following command from a privileged
CLI prompt:
show running-config | include enable [secret|password]
The following example shows a device on which an "enable secret"
password has been configured:
Router#show running-config | include enable [secret|password]
enable secret 5 $1$1yfp$qM7qAChXVXYp8ee2qm2Kf/
Router#
The following example shows a device on which no "enable password" or
"enable secret" has been configured:
Router#show running-config | include enable [secret|password]
Router#
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow for the
execution of commands on the device at any privilege level, up to and
including privilege level 15. Accessing the device at privilege level
15 would enable total control of the device, including but not limited
to device configuration changes and device reloading.
Software Version and Fixes
==========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
This issue is fixed for new installations in CRWS version 3.3.0 build
31, which is available at
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/crws
Information about how to install CRWS version 3.3.0 build 31 can be
found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/netmgtsw/ps2076/prod_troubleshooting_guide09186a0080132c3c.html#1080818
Existing CRWS users or customers upgrading to CRWS version 3.3.0 build
31 from any previous version should deploy the workarounds mentioned in
the Workarounds section of this security advisory. Upgrading the CRWS
software on the device from a previous version to a fixed software
version will not eliminate the vulnerability for existing
installations.
Workarounds
===========
There are multiple workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability. Existing
CRWS customers, and customers upgrading to a new CRWS version from a
previous one, should deploy one of the following workarounds if
vulnerable to this issue. Upgrading to a new CRWS version is not enough
to eliminate this vulnerability.
* Workaround 1 - Disabling the Cisco IOS HTTP Server Functionality
Customers not using the CRWS application to configure or manage
their devices and not needing the functionality provided by the
Cisco IOS HTTP server can disable it by adding the following
commands to their device configuration:
no ip http server
no ip http secure-server
The second command might return an error message if the Cisco IOS
version installed and running on the device does not support the
SSL functionality. This error message is harmless and can be safely
ignored.
* Workaround 2 - Enabling Authentication of Requests to the Cisco IOS
HTTP Server by Configuring an Enable Password
Customers using the CRWS application to configure or manage their
devices, or requiring the functionality provided by the Cisco IOS
HTTP server must configure an authentication mechanism for access
to the Cisco IOS HTTP server interface. One of those options is to
configure an "enable secret" or "enable password" password. The "enable
password" is the default authentication mechanism used by the Cisco
IOS HTTP server if no other method has been configured.
In order to configure an "enable secret" password, add the following
command to the device configuration:
enable secret <mypassword>
Replace <mypassword> with a strong password of your choosing. For
guidance on strong passwords, please refer to your site security
policy. The document entitled "Cisco IOS Password Encryption
Facts", available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk59/technologies_tech_note09186a00801d7efa.shtml
explains the differences between the "enable secret" and the "enable
password" commands.
* Workaround 3 - Enabling Authentication of Requests to the Cisco IOS
HTTP Server by using an Authentication Mechanism Other than the
Default
Configure an authentication mechanism for access to the Cisco IOS
HTTP server other than the default. Such authentication mechanisms
can be the local user database, or a previously defined AAA
(Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) method. As the
procedure to enable an authentication mechanism for the Cisco IOS
HTTP server varies across Cisco IOS releases and other additional
factors, no example will be provided. Customers looking for
information about how to configure an authentication mechanism for
the Cisco IOS HTTP server are encouraged to read the document
entitled "AAA Control of the IOS HTTP Server", available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk59/technologies_tech_note09186a008069bdc5.shtml.
Note: The only authentication method tested and supported for use
with the CRWS application is the local user database. No other
methods (including the use of an external RADIUS or TACACS+ server)
are supported.
In addition to those workarounds, it is highly recommended that
customers limit access to their Cisco IOS HTTP server to only trusted
management workstations. Information on how to restrict access to the
Cisco IOS HTTP server based on IP addresses can be found at
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios122/122cgcr/ffun_c/ffcprt1/fcf005.htm#1000973.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software
becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise
using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms
of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html , or as otherwise
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com .
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades
for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT
YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled
copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-crws.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | 2006 July 12 | Initial |
| 1.0 | 1600 UTC | public |
| | (GMT) | release |
+----------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions
for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco
security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
All contents are Copyright 1992-2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Jul 12, 2006 Document ID: 70650
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Intrusion Prevention System Malformed
Packet Denial of Service
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060712-ips
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-ips.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2006 July 12 1600 UTC (GMT)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
========
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Version and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) software version 5.1 is
vulnerable to a denial of service condition caused by a malformed
packet, which may result in an IPS device becoming inaccessible
remotely or via the console and fail to process packets. A power
reset is required to recover the IPS device. There are no workarounds
for this vulnerability.
Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-ips.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Cisco Intrusion Prevention System 42xx appliances running IPS
software versions 5.1(1), 5.1(1a), 5.1(1b), 5.1(1c), 5.1(1d), 5.1(1e)
or 5.1(p1).
IPS software versions 5.1(1a), 5.1(1b), 5.1(1c), 5.1(1d) and 5.1(1e)
are repackaged versions of 5.1(1) created to fix various installation
problems. All 5.1(1) patch versions report 5.1(1) as the installed
version.
Note: Some IDS/IPS appliances shipped before IPS software version 5.0
was available and have model numbers starting with IDS, not IPS.
The following 42xx appliances are potentially affected.
* IDS-4235
* IPS-4240
* IDS-4250-SX
* IDS-4250-TX
* IDS-4250-XL (4250 with XL accelerator card)
* IPS-4255
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
All devices running Cisco Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) software
versions 4.x or IPS versions 5.0(x).
Additionally, the following devices are not vulnerable even if
running IPS software versions 5.1(1), 5.1(1a), 5.1(1b), 5.1(1c), 5.1
(1d), 5.1(1e) or 5.1(1p1).
* NM-CIDS
* IDSM-2
* ASA-SSM-AIP-10
* ASA-SSM-AIP-20
* IDS-4210
* IDS-4215
The following devices do not support IPS software version 5.1 and are
not vulnerable.
* IDS-4220
* IDS-4230
To determine the version of software running an IPS device, log into
the IPS device using an SSH client and issue the command show version.
sensor#show version
Application Partition: Cisco Intrusion
Prevention System, Version 5.1(1p1)S215.0
Details
=======
Cisco Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) are a family of network
security devices that provide network based threat prevention
services. A vulnerability exists in the custom device driver for
Intel-based gigabit network adapters used to process packets received
by the sensing interfaces of certain IPS devices. A malformed IP
packet received on an Intel-based gigabit network adapter configured
for use as a sensing interface may result in the IPS device
experiencing a kernel panic. Affected IPS devices will cease
processing packets, producing alerts, performing automated actions
such as logging, and become inaccessible remotely or via the console.
If deployed as an inline device, the IPS will also stop forwarding
packets between interfaces and may cause a network outage. IPS
devices configured to use the auto-bypass feature will also fail to
forward packets. Attackers may use this vulnerability to disable an
IPS device to hide malicious activity. This vulnerability only
affects certain IPS devices configured to use Intel-based gigabit
network adapters as sensing interfaces. IPS devices configured to use
an Intel-based gigabit network adapter as a management interface are
not affected by this vulnerability. A power reset is required to
recover the IPS device.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsd36590 (
registered customers only) .
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in the
failure of an IPS device to operate as expected. Affected devices
will become inaccessible remotely or via the console and stop
processing packets. If deployed as an inline device, an IPS device
will stop forwarding packets, including devices configured to use the
auto-bypass feature. This may result in a network outage. A power
reset is required to recover the IPS device.
Software Version and Fixes
==========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
This issue is fixed in IPS version 5.1(2) which is available for
download at http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ips5
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed
software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers
should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for
feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their
environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by
the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as
otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com .
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-ips.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | 2006-July-12 | Initial |
| 1.0 | 1600 UTC | public |
| | (GMT) | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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